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ESSENTIAL VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE: THE
APPLICATION OF INTEREST ANALYSIS AND




Marriage is the very foundation of civil society, and no part
of the laws and institutions of a country can be of more vital
importance to its subjects than those which regulate the manner
and conditions of forming, and if necessary, of dissolving, the
marriage contract.'
Marriage, as the above statement reveals, is an important institution
that affects the status of the parties concerned, as well, of course, as the state
interests of the parties' marital residence and pre-marriage domiciliary laws.
The focus of this article is to consider the current Anglo-American
jurisprudence in relation to the issue of validity of marriage and to suggest
that a new twin-centered rationale, derived from interest analysis and
depecage principles,2 ought to be applied to resolve difficulties when the
laws of two or more interested jurisdictions present a conflict. Competing
policy interests between states lie at the heart of the question of the
extraterritorial effect to be accorded to a marriage. There are contrasting
sensitivities between societies as to which types of marital unions, for various
*. M.A., Cantab, LL.M., University of Virginia, Solicitor and Reader in Law, Sunderland
Business School at Sunderland University. The author is grateful to Mr. Adrian Briggs, St.
Edmund Hall, Oxford University, Professor Trevor Hartley, London School of Economics,
Professor John Bell, University at Leeds, and Professor Jonathan Hill, University of Bristol,
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Shaw v. Gould, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 55, 82 (H.L. 1868).
2. Depecage is used in this context to indicate an ability to "pick and choose" different laws
to govern different specific issues. See NORTH & FAWCETT, CHESHIRE ANDNORTH'S PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-57 (12th ed. 1992).
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eugenic, religious, moral, and economic concerns, impinge upon their policy
interests to such an extent that the union should be declared void.3 The
matter of validity of a marriage arises as a preliminary question in a
multitude of different situations: immigration; petitions for annulment,
divorce and judicial separation; social welfare legislation; succession;
matrimonial financial relief; and even in criminal proceedings including
those for bigamy, cruelty, desertion, and assault.4 An added ingredient here
has been increased worldwide mobility between countries, which has
enhanced the requirements of resolution of essential marital validity
questions through application of conflict of law principles. At the very outset
it is important to examine the policy objectives, both general and specific,
which choice of law rules in this area of law should seek to achieve; the list
that follows, mainly derived from decided cases, is not set out in any especial
order of priority.5
1. Presumption in favor of validity ofmarriage. The basic policy here
is that marriages should, wherever possible, be held valid. This serves to
preserve the family ties, with marriage propagated as a desirable enclave for
bringing up children.6
2. Protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties. It is unjust
to upset the parties' expectations by applying a law that they could not
3. The five main prohibitions are non-age, remarriage after divorce, consanguinity and
affinity, polygamy, and lack of consent. Difficulties are exacerbated in that "what might be
deemed a mere regulation in one state might be regarded as a matter affecting the morals and
good order of society in another." Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 308; 87 Tenn. 244, 254
(Tenn. 1889).
4. See Peter D. Maddaugh, Validity of Marriage and the Conflict ofLaws: A Critique ofthe
Present Anglo-American Position, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1973).
5. The list is drawn together from a variety of disparate sources. See Elliott E. Cheatham
and Willis L. M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 969 (1952);
Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV.
267, 283 (1966); Hessel E. Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN.
BAR REV. 721, 723 (1957); Willis L.M. Reese, see Marriage in American Conflict of Laws
in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 252, 267 (1977); see generally T.
C. Hartley, The Policy Basis of the English Conflict of Laws of Marriage, 35 MOD. L. REV.
571, 571-72 (1972); see Sir Peter North, Development ofRules of Private International Law
in the Field of Family Law in ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-169 (1992).
6. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 378-89 (1962), for
a discussion on the influence of this policy in private international law in the United States.
This policy is more important when the validity of a marriage is being considered
retrospectively. It is a factor regarded by Swan as significant enough to presumptively
override all others. See John Swan, A New Approach to Marriage and Divorce in the
Conflict of Laws, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 17, 27, 39-41 (1974).
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reasonably have contemplated.7 On the bases of fairness and justice, it may
also be egregious to alter an assumption, on which the parties have conducted
their lives for a number of years, subject to the proviso that there are indeed
reasonable grounds for their expectations.
3. Certainty and predictability. It is obviously desirable that the
parties should know, or be able to ascertain, without the necessity of
litigation, the applicable law.8 This consideration is of particular importance
in the field of marriage where the interest of the parties may be of an
essentially prospective nature and involves the question; "Do I have capacity
to enter into this marital union?" This factor points toward the need for
definite choice of law principles, not vague or flexible rules.
4. Convenience. As the English Law Commission has stated the
choice of law rules should point to a law that is convenient for the parties and
about which they can readily obtain professional advice.9 It is important to
take into account here the convenience of marriage officials in the country
of celebration. Such officials cannot reasonably be expected to solemnize
marriages in accordance with the law of other countries. The implication
behind this policy, paying adherence to the convenience of courts and
litigants, will predominantly favor the application of the law of the forum.
The natural tendency will be to prefer forum law in the absence of
compelling reasons to the contrary, since presumptively counsel and judges
have more intimacy with their own practices.'"
5. Eugenic concerns and maintenance of family stability. The rules
on consanguinity and affinity may be supported on these grounds. The
prevention of inter-breeding may be predicated on eugenic or genetic
arguments; affinity rules disallowing marriages between stepmother and
stepson or between adoptive siblings may be predicated upon irreparable
disruption to family stability." Non-age rules also relate to family stability
arguments.
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §. 6 (2) (d).
8. See Peter M. North, Development ofRules ofPrivate International Law, in 166 RECUEIL
DES COURS, COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-45
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, eds., 1980).
9. See Law Commission Working Paper No. 89, Private International Law: Choice of Law
Rules in Marriage (1985), para. 2.35 (hereafter L.C.W.P. No 89).
10. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 571.
11. See Victor Bailey and Sarah McCabe, Reforming the Law of Incest, [1979] CRIM. L.R.
749, 757-58; see S. M. CRETNEY, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 38-39 (3d ed. 1979); and see
generally Alexander Morgan Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 618 (1979) (discussing civil liability for genetic counseling).
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6. Moral, religious, and cultural infrastructures. These elements are
the bases behind rules preventing same-sex marriages, bigamy, and
polygamy. They also are significant in the application of consent grounds in
that marital unions entered into through force or duress may contravene the
sensitivities of the relevant society.
7. International uniformity of decisions. The aim here is to present
"limping marriages," regarded as valid in one country but not in another, and
to promote uniformity of status. This points to the exclusion of the law of the
forum as the applicable law as that is the one law that makes it impossible to
achieve uniformity.
8. Domestic policy of foreign law. By reason of comity or
internationalism, the choice of law rules of the forum should give due regard
to the interest of a foreign country, in the application of its own laws.
The experience on both sides of the Atlantic has been to apply broad
jurisdiction, selecting rules to choice of law for essential validity of marriage,
without regard to the underlying specific issue at hand. The revolution in the
United States in choice of law that has been applied to contract and tort,
involving the adoption of interest analysis principles, has left the family law
area relatively untouched. 2 There is a certain irony in this regard, as it is
suggested in this article that the question of marital validity, impacting on
personal status, and identifiable state interests in regulating parties who
establish matrimonial residences within their borders as well as marriages
effected by their domiciliaries, is ripe for the application of a modified
interest analysis theory. What is propounded is a more restrictive adoption
of interest analysis, avoiding the excessive judicial particularistic
intuitionism, the special brand of casuistic "Khadi-justiz" (ad hoc decisions
deduced from mystical references to interests), and dated rule-scepticism that
has plagued the United States experience in both contract and tort. 3 It is
argued that interest analysis has a place in the formulation of rule specific
principles to choice of law that enables the parties to prophylactically
12. See generally Michael Davie, The Breaking-Up of Essential Validity of Marriage
Choice of Law Rules in English Conflict of Laws, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 32 (1994).
13. For a selection of the expanding material criticizing interest analysis, see generally
Frederich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis 32 AM. J. COMP. L.
1 (1984); Harold L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772
(1983); J.J. Fawcett, Is American Governmental Interest Analysis the Solution to English Tort
Choice of Law Problems?, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 150 (1982); TH. M. DE BOER., BEYOND
LEX Loci DELICTI (1987); LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS (1991).
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determine the outcome of competing state validating or invalidating rules to
particular choice of law concerns.'
4
A panacea to the current vagaries of English choice of law doctrine
would be to adopt a form of depecage analysis to marriage validity in which
choice of law issues, rather than lumped together at present, are split down
into identifiable and different groups of issues. Interest analysis can then be
combined with this depecage splitting to promulgate specific and certain rule
formulation. Interest analysis can be directed at the real competing state
interests that are in conflict, disregarding false conflicts that are revealed, and
consequently addressing the inherent policy grounds that lead to invalidation
of marriage.
Thus, it is argued that this twin approach can beneficially advance the
significant policy objectives as outlined, specifically adopting an overall
presumption in favor of marriage, protecting the reasonable expectations of
the parties, an acceptable degree of certainty and predictability, in tandem
with convenience, whilst also promoting international uniformity of
decisions. An extended application will be given to Baade's stark proposal
that the solution to essential validity matters for marriage is to simply focus
on the, "purposes, policies, aims, and objectives of each of the competing
local law rules, everything else is material only because it is reflected in these
rules as teleologically interpreted."' 5 Before expanding on these proposed
new rule formulations it is necessary to review the current parlous state of the
law in England and the United States.
14. For a discussion of proposed application of interest analysis to marital validity in
Canada, see generally Maddaugh, supra note 4; Swan, supra note 6. In the English context,
see generally Richard Fentiman, The Validity of Marriage and the Proper Law, 44
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 256 (1985); P. St. J. Smart, Interest Analysis, False Conflicts, and the
Essential Validity of Marriage 14 ANGLO-AM. L.R. 225 (1986); Richard Fentiman, Activity
in the Law of Status: Domicile, Marriage and the Law Commission, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 353 (1986). In the Anglo-American sphere, see generally Peter M. North, Reform, but
not Revolution: General Course on Private International Law, I Recueil Des Cours 220
(1990); see North, supra note 5, at 109-169; see generally Davie, supra note 12.
15. There is a marked paucity of American academic writing on the issue of capacity to
marry. But see Hans W. Baade, Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law:
Governmental Interests Analysis and the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV. 329, 378
(1972); see generally David E. Engdahl, Proposalfor a Benign Revolution in Marriage Law
and Marriage Conflicts Law, 55 IOWA L. REV. 56 (1969); David J. Fine, Application ofIssue
Analysis, 26 LOY. L. REV. 31 (1980).
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. England
From an English perspective, rules about the validity of marriage for
choice of law purposes are delineated into two distinct classes: those
addressing formal validity and those concerned with essential validity. The
former is concerned with the law which governs the ceremony and related
procedures required for the valid celebration of a marriage.16 Issues of
formal validity encompass the following matters: the nature of any civil or
religious ceremony required, whether a licence to marry must be obtained, 7
the availability of proxy marriages," requirement of parental consent," the
need for witnesses and registration, and type of premises where marriages
may be celebrated."z Essential validity, by way of contrast, focuses on the
capacity of the parties to create a personal status of husband and wife.21 No
difficulties exist with the application of English choice of law principles to
formal validity. It has been well established since at least the eighteenth
century that the formal validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the
place of celebration, the lex loci celebrationis. This rule is an application of
the maxim locus regit actum, and was clearly stated by Viscount Dunedin in
Berthiaume v. Dastous:
If a marriage is good by the laws of the country where it is
effected, it is good all the world over, no matter whether
the proceeding or ceremony which constituted marriage
16. See NORTH AND FAWCETT, supra note 2, at 572-586; MCCLEAN, Morris: The Conflict
Of Laws, (4th ed., 1993) at 149-152; and CLARKSON AND HILL, Jaffey On The Conflict Of
Laws (1997) at 298-307.
17. See Berthiaume v. Dastous, 1930 A.C. 79 (P.C.).
18. See Apt v. Apt, 1948 P. 83 (Eng. C.A.). At issue here is the method of giving consent
and the question whether the parties must be physically present at the ceremony. However,
the reality of consent as distinct from the mode of giving it is not a matter of form.
19. See Ogden v. Ogden, 1908 P. 46 (Eng. C.A.).
20. See generally, Edward J. Sykes, The Formal Validity ofMarriage, 2 INT'L&COMPL.Q.
78 (1952); D. Mendes da Costa, The Formalities of Marriage in the Conflict ofLaws, 7 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 217 (1958); see LENNARTPALSSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN COMPARATIVE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, Ch. 6 (1981); North, supra note 8, at 69-77.
21. See Pennegar, text accompanying supra note 3; see Way v. Way, 1950 P. 71 (Eng. C.A.)
(lack of consent); R v. Naguib, 1 K.B. 359 (Eng. C.A. 1917) (prior subsisting marriage);
Brook v. Brook, 9 H.L.C. 193 (Eng. 1861); R v. Brentwood Superintendent Registrar of
Marriages, Ex parte Arias 2 Q.B. 956 (Eng. 1968) (remarriage after earlier divorce).
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according to the law of the place would or would not
constitute marriage in the country of the domicile of one or
other of the spouses. If the so-called marriage is no
marriage in the place where it is celebrated, there is no
marriage anywhere, although the ceremony or proceeding
if conducted in the place of the parties' domicile would be
considered a good marriage.22
The certainty of choice of law application to matters of formal
validity is in stark contrast to the beguiling confusion over issues of essential
validity. There are three different theories jousting for control,23 and this
surfeit of options has led, on occasion, to courts engaging in selective
'cherry-picking' of preferred theory to deliver ad hoc justice in particularly
hard cases. A by-product of this uncertainty has been excessive judicial
creativity in an area requiring logical policy analysis of the countervailing
issues. The three theories are the dual domicile theory, the intended
matrimonial home theory, and the most real and substantial connection
theory.24 It is submitted that each of them has peculiar merits and demerits
in application.
1. The Dual Domicile Theory
In accordance with the traditional dual domicile theory, it is
necessary to examine the law of each party's domicile at the date of the
marriage. Capacity to marry is governed by the law of the parties' ante-
nuptial domiciles: each party must have capacity, according to the law of his
or her domicile at the time of the ceremony, to marry the other. This
approach is associated with Professor Dicey,25 who added his imprimatur to
22. Berthiaume, 1930 A.C. at 83. See generally Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hag. Con. 395
(Eng. 1752); Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hag. Con. 54 (Eng. 1811); Warrender v.
Warrender, 1835 S. 488 (Scotland); Kenward v. Kenward 1950 All E.R. 297 (Eng. C.A.); R
v. Bham I Q.B. 159 (Eng. 1966). In McCabe, a marriage ceremony was performed in Ghana.
The respective parties, Irish and Ghanaian domiciliaries, were absent from the ceremony but
the putative husband had sent £100 and a bottle of gin. Relatives from both sides of the
union were present who toasted the health of the absent spouses, and distributed the dowry
amongst themselves. The marriage, in compliance with African custom, was formally valid
under Ghanaian law. McCabe v. McCabe 1 F.L.R. 410 (Eng. 1994).
23. See Davie, supra note 12, at 32.
24. See Davie, supra note 12, at 32-7; NORTH AND FAWCETT, supra note 2, at 56-7, 587-89;
MCCLEAN, supra note 16, at 152-55; CLARKSON AND HILL, supra note 16, at 307-15.
25. A.V. DICEY, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 254-55 (8th ed. 1967).
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the doctrine, and the balance of English judicial authority supports this rigid
jurisdiction-selection reference test.26
The theory has a number of advantages. A primary justification is
that it promotes certainty. The test is relatively easy to apply in the
prospective situation and enables the parties' marital status to be ascertained
with certainty at the time of the marriage.27 Certainty is promulgated in that
the test is backward looking to the parties' domiciles before marriage, rather
than forward looking to the establishment of a potential marital residence.
It comports with common sense to submit marital capacity to legal
connections existing at the date of marriage, not a subsequent indeterminate
date. This facilitates the task of individuals, such as marriage officials and
legal advisers, who are called upon to provide advice as to whether a
marriage would be valid if it were to be celebrated. 8
In principle, the dual domicile theory can be supported in that it
submits matters of validity to the personal law of the parties. Marriage itself
creates a status and, thus, it seems logical to adduce the validity of that status
to the personal law of the parties that will usually have governed their status
for a long time, if not for their whole life. It undoubtedly accords with the
reasonable expectations of the respective parties that their existing personal
law is determinative. By applying the ante-nuptial domicile of both parties
the dual domicile theory adopts an even-handed approach to the sexes, in
contrast with the intended matrimonial home formulation, set out below.
The adoption of any other test would enable the parties to evade the
restrictions imposed by their ante-nuptial domiciliary law.29  The dual
domicile theory has the approval of the English Law Commission who stated:
The main rationale of the dual domicile rule is that a
person's status is a matter of public concern to the country
to which he belongs at the time of marriage; and therefore
26. See generally In re Paine, 1 Ch. 46 (Ch. 1939); Pugh v. Pugh, [1951] P. 482 (Eng.
C.A.); R v. Brentwood, 2 Q.B. 956; Padolecchia v. Padolecchia, [ 1968] P. 314 (Eng. C.A.);
Szechter v. Szechter, 1971 P. 286 (Eng. C.A.). See Marriage (Enabling) Act 1960 § 1 (3);
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 § 11 (d) (two statutory provisions also supporting a dual
domicile perspective). Many of the earlier decisions did not provide conclusive support for
either test. See generally, Brook, 9 H.L.C. 193; In re De Wilton, 2 Ch. 481 (1900).
27. See L.C.W.P. No. 89 (1985) at para. 3.36 (b); Hartley (1972) 35 M.L.R. 571, at 576; and
North, Reform, but not Revolution. General Course on Private International Law, vol. 1220
Recueil Des Cours (1990), 9 at 54.
28. See MCCLEAN, supra note 16, at 153.
29. See CLARKSON AND HILL, supra note 16, at 308.
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the domiciliary law of each party has an equal right to be
heard. The issue of whether a valid marriage has been or
may be contracted should, in principle and in logic, depend
on the conditions existing at the time of marriage rather
than subsequently.
30
The rigid dual domicile approach, however, suffers from a number
of substantial disadvantages. The cumulative nature of the test, looking at
both parties' ante-nuptial domiciliary laws, greatly increases the likelihood
of the marriage being declared invalid, than if a single determinative law
were applied. 3' This runs counter to the policy objective of presuming in
favor of upholding the validity of a marriage, described in the introductory
section. Additionally, the theory is open to criticism in that it fails to
consider the focal point of the marriage, the law to which the marriage
belongs, the matrimonial residence of the parties. It is this community where
the incidents of the relationship will have their impact. 32 Difficulties also
result from the idiosyncratic nature of the English concept of domicile.33 As
the Law Commission admitted, the establishment of domicile has "become
overloaded with technical and complex rules."34 It may even be the case that,
through the revival of a domicile of origin, an individual could be domiciled
in a country which he has never visited and with which he has no current
connection. This is hardly a rational solution to apply the law of that
country to govern capacity to marry. Anti-evasion is also a possibility in that
it may be feasible for a person to acquire a new domicile of choice prior to
the marriage; recent English judicial developments have relaxed the
30. L.C.W.P. No. 89 (1985), at para. 3.36.
31. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 578.
32. See Smart, supra note 14, at 228-29.
33. See generally J.J. Fawcett, Result Selection in Domicile Cases, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 378 (1985); P.B. Carter, Domicil: The Case for Radical Reform in the United
Kingdom, 36 INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 713 (1987); Blaikie, "The Domicile of Dependent Children:
A Necessary Unity" [ 1984] Jur. Rev. 1; J.A. Wade, Domicile: A Re-Examination of Certain
Rules, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 885 (1984); M.P. Pilkington, Illegal Residence and the
Acquisition of a Domicile of Choice, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 885 (1984); Richard Fentiman,
Domicile Revisited, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 445 (1991).
34. L.C.W.P. No. 89 (1985) at para. 3.28.
35. See generally Udny v. Udny LRI Sc & Div. 441 (1869); Tee v. Tee, 3 All ER 1105
(C.A. 1973).
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restrictive animus3 6 requirement for acquisition of a new domicile of choice.
Dual domicile theory, as a rigid jurisdiction-selection test, also suffers from
the fault of failing to evaluate the particular issue raised when the question
of essential validity is in dispute. A palliative cure, adopting an issue-
sensitive approach, is the focus of the article.
2. The Intended Matrimonial Home Theory
The main alternative theory is that the parties' capacity to marry is
determined by the law of their intended matrimonial home (sometimes called
the matrimonial domicile). 37  This test, associated in England with Dr
Cheshire, and with the principal early proponents in the United States being
Cook 38 and Taintor,39 can be more fully stated as follows:
The basic presumption is that capacity to marry is governed
by the law of the husband's domicil at the time of the
marriage, for normally it is in the country of that domicil
that the parties intend to establish their permanent home.
This presumption, however, is rebutted if it can be inferred
that the parties at the time of the marriage intended to
establish their home in a certain country and that they did
in fact establish it there within a reasonable time. n°
36. See Re Furse, 3 All ER 838 (Ch. 1980); Brown v. Brown, 3 Fam. 212 (1981); and
Plummer v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 1 All ER 97 (Ch. 1988) (evidencing a more
rational shift towards the application of a real and substantial connection test as the measure
of domiciliary intent). See Winans v. Attorney Gen. [1904] A.C. 287 (H.L.); Ramsay v.
Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] A.C. 588 (providing a more restrictive permanent home
test).
37. There is not inconsiderable support for the intended matrimonial home test. See De
Reneville v. De Reneville [1948] P. 100, 114, 121-122 (but these statements were made
obiter as the question of capacity to marry was not directly in issue). See generally Kenward,
1950 All E.R. 297; Bliersbach v. McEven [1959] S.L.T. 81 (1" Div.); Radwan v. Radwan
(No. 2), [1973] Fam. 35.
38. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAws, 448 (1942).
39. See Charles W. Taintor, Marriage in the Conflict ofLaws, 9 VAND. L. REV. 607 (1956);
Charles W. Taintor, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of Marriage, 19
BUL REV. 353 (1939).
40. G.C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 277-78 (7th ed. 1965).
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The male-orientated presumption in Cheshire's test, pointing to the
law of the husband's domicile on the premise that the parties will make their
permanent home in his country, is totally out of touch with modem
etymologies of gender equality. It may or may not have been true over fifty
years ago, but in any event through the abolition of the married woman's
domicile of dependence, this perspective is no longer cogent.4' A better
rationale of the intended matrimonial home test today is that it displaces dual
domicile theory in cases where the parties intend to and actually establish a
matrimonial home within a reasonable time frame. The central tenet of this
theory is that the state in which the parties establish their matrimonial home
has a greater interest in that marriage than the state to which the parties
belonged before the marriage.
The great advantage of adopting the intended matrimonial home
doctrine is that it allows the validity of a marriage to be tested by the
community of the country most affected by, and involved with, the parties'
marital status. Presumptively, it is socially undesirable that a marriage which
is not regarded as detrimental to the community to which the parties belong
after the marriage, for example a marriage between first cousins, should be
pronounced void, merely because one or other or both of the parties were
formerly connected with a country in which a different view prevails. The
"true seat" of the marriage, the proper law, is the actual matrimonial
residence itself.42 A connected matter here is to give effect to the objective
of upholding the reasonable expectations of the parties, to uphold the validity
of a marriage, good in the community where the parties have resided for a
significant period, rather than invoke a impediment under pre-nuptial
domiciliary law.4 a
A prime example of the doctrine being invoked in a hard case to
promote party expectation was Radwan v. Radwan (No. 2)," where the
intended matrimonial home test enabled the court to uphold the validity of
a polygamous marriage after the parties had lived together as man and wife
for nearly twenty years and had eight children. The other significant
advantage of the theory is that, unlike the rival dual domicile approach, it
41. L.C.W.P. No. 89 (1985) at para. 3.34; A.J.E. Jaffey, The Essential Validity of Marriage
In the English Conflict of Laws, 39 MOD. L. REV. 41 (1978).
42. Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (1956) Cmnd. 9678, para.
889; Bliersbach, [1959] S.L.T. at 89.
43. See P.A. Stone, Capacity for Polygamy--Judicial Rectification ofLegislative Error, 13
FAM. LAW 76, 78-80 (1983).
44. See generally Radwan, [1973] Fam. 35.
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promotes the validity of marriages. It favors marital validity in that the test
ensures that only one law governs the question of capacity to marry, thus, it
reduces by half the opportunity for an invalidating impediment striking down
the union.
There are, however, a number of significant criticisms that may be
raised against the rigid jurisdiction-selection rule of an intended matrimonial
home test to govern all nature of essential validity issues."5 The test is
inherently uncertain, which causes significant difficulties for marriage
officials engaged in addressing the initial validity of the marriage. The
doctrine is inoperable prospectively and only operates in a retrospective
sphere. It seems that, self-evidently, the test requires the necessity of waiting
for some time to see if and where the matrimonial home is established.46
During this moratorium the validity of the marriage cannot properly be
decided and, perforce, must be held in suspended abeyance: this is a
regrettable vacuum given that property devolution may depend upon the
validity of the "in limbo marriage." This point has been cogently stressed by
a number of leading commentators,47 who have also noted that it is possible
in some cases that no matrimonial home at all may be established:
Very serious practical difficulties are likely to arise if the
validity of a marriage has to remain in suspense while we
wait and see (for an unspecified period) whether or not the
parties implement their (unexpressed) ante-nuptial
intention to acquire another domicile. This is especially
true if interests in property depend on the validity of a
marriage, as, for instance, where a widow's pension ceases
on her remarriage.48
It may well be fallacious to universally assume that it is the law of the
intended matrimonial home that has the greatest interest in the marriage. A
number of impediments to marriage are designed to protect the individual
person, for example, the age requirement under English law that no marriage
45. See Smart, supra note 14, at 228-229.
46. L.C.W.P. No. 89 (1985) at para. 334; see generally H. Patrick Glenn, Capacity to Marry
in the Conflict of Laws: Some Variations on a Theme, 4 DALHOUSIE L.J. 157 (1977).
47. See NORTH AND FAWCETT, supra note 2, at 589; MCCLEAN, supra note 16, at 6, 154;
Smart, supra note 14, at 228; Hartley, supra note 5, at 2; Jaffey, supra note 41, at 11;
Fentiman, supra note 14, at 5; CLARKSON AND HILL, supra note 16, at 311.
48. MCCLEAN, supra note 16, at 154.
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may be contracted until the age of sixteen. The purpose of this prohibition
is to protect against immaturity and demonstrates an imbued paternal state
interest in the welfare of its own domiciliaries. This interest is of an
enduring nature and the purpose will be defeated if the marriage of a girl
under age by her English domiciliary law were to be held valid, and this is
so irrespective of whether the minor settles in a union abroad.49 It is arguable
that the intended matrimonial home test opens the door to evasion of the
capacity rules of the pre-nuptial domiciliary laws of the respective parties,
and which have a legitimate concern in their status and in the application of
their rules as to capacity.5"
The test may, on occasion, negate effecting the reasonable
expectations of the parties and promulgation of marital validity.5" A
significant migratory trend over the course of the last few decades has been
movement of people from developing into developed countries, and from
states permitting polygamy to those adopting the practice of monogamous
marriages, declaring polygamous unions to be void.52 The trends similarly
reveal movement of people from countries where the age at which the parties
can lawfully marry is fourteen for boys and twelve for girls, to higher age
group limits such as sixteen in England. The impact of applying intended
matrimonial home theory to these individuals, who emigrate to England, may
be to invalidate a marriage which is valid by the law of the domicile of both
parties at the time of marriage, consequently abrogating the parties'
reasonable expectations.53 In the light of such excoriating criticisms it seems
apparent that the test is unsuitable as a universal choice of law doctrine to all
issues of essential validity. However, it does have a role to play as an
49. The cogency of this paternal interest was manifested by the public outcry in England in
a marriage effected by a 13-year-old domiciliary abroad. In this cause celebre, the girl went
through a marriage ceremony in Turkey with a 19-year-old Turkish domiciliary, and set up
home therein, before her eventual return to England on the failure of the adolescent
relationship. See Michael Horsnell, Waiter is charged with rape of schoolgirl bride, LON.
TIMES, January 24, 1996, at p.1.
50. See Smart, supra note 45, at 228.
51. See CLARKSON AND HILL, supra note 16, at 312.
52. U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1989 (4 lot issue, 1991) at 553, 598; European
Communities Statistical Office, Migration Statistics (1994) at 58-59.
53. In a number of South American countries (Columbia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Chile, and
Panama), the age of lawful marriage is 12 for girls and 14 for boys. See UN Demographic
Yearbook 1993 (45th issue, 1995)) at 546-556. See generally I.G.F. Karsten, Capacity to
Contract a Polygamous Marriage, 36 MOD. L. REV. 291 (1973); Davie, supra note 12, at 35.
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appropriate doctrine to selective issues of capacity, and these legitimate
interests are subsequently explored.1
4
3. The Real And Substantial Connection Theory
This third approach has derived out of the proper law test in contract,
and the English common law test for foreign divorce recognition established
in Indyka v Indyka,"5 with the ideal to connect the marital union with the
community to which it empathetically belongs.16 The proper law of the
marriage is demarcated as being the system of law that has the most real and
substantial connection with the marriage. This will often correlate to the
state where the matrimonial home is situated, but not necessarily so, as the
inherent flexibility of the test allows consideration of a multiplicity of
relevant factors embracing domicile, nationality, residence, intention, and
place of contracting. The test is viewed as sociologically desirable in looking
to where the couple actually conduct their married life to rule on validity.
Sykes first propounded the idea in 1955.57 It lay dormant collecting dust on
library shelves for a number of decades but then was revived in the choice of
law arena by English courts during the course of the 1980's, 58 as well'as
through support from academic commentators.5 9
54. Discussed further below in the context of polygamy, consanguinity, and divorce
regulation.
55. Indyka v. Indyka, 1 A.C. 33 (H.L. 1969).
56. The test for divorce recognition was abandoned in the Recognition of Divorces and
Legal Separations Act of 1971 and for nullity recognition by the Family Law Act of 1986.
Morris derided the test in the following term. "[T]he effect ... has been to leave the law in
a state of grave uncertainty on a matter where certainty is most desirable ... [T]here has been
a spate of cases on the recognition of foreign divorces; the courts have been left to grope their
way as best they can through the uncertainties of what constitutes a real and substantial
connection; and large numbers ofpeople simply do not know whether or not they are married,
and if so, to whom." MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed. 1971). See generally P.R.H.
Webb, The Old Order Changeth-Travers v. Holley Reinterpreted, 16 INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 997
(1967).
57. See Edward I. Sykes, The Essential Validity of Marriage, 4 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 159,
165 (1955). The proposal was that capacity should be governed by the proper law of the
contract to marry. In essence, the law applicable was determinable as the law of that country
with which the contract had the most real connection.
58. Vervaeke v. Smith [1983] A.C. 145, 166 (H.L. 1982); Lawrence v. Lawrence [1985]
Fam 106, 115.
59. See generally Fentiman, supra note 14 CAMBRIDGE L.J.; Smart, supra note 14; see
Fentiman, supra note 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
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The revival of interest in the test can be attributed to its consideration
by Lord Simon (obiter) in the House of Lords in Vervaeke v. Smith,60 a
notorious case enshrined as the Belgian prostitute affair. At issue was a
pernicious marriage of convenience, contracted in England, between an
English domiciliary and a Belgian prostitute, and effected purely to allow her
to become resident in England and to acquire British nationality. It was
obviously not intended that any matrimonial home would ever be established.
In accordance with Belgian law, that of the petitioner's domicile, the
marriage was a sham and thus void, whereas by English law the marriage,
though a sham was nonetheless valid.61 According to Lord Simon the key
issue was whether a marriage had transpired, what he called "quintessential
validity." Resolution of this question would be by the application of "the law
of the territory with which the marriage has the most real and substantial
connection. 62 This test was subsequently judicially applied to the issue of
remarriage after a foreign divorce63 and to capacity to enter a polygamous
64marriage.
This proper law test has drawn support on the basis of its flexibility
and because it provides a sound policy-orientated solution to ameliorate the
difficult cases under orthodox doctrine where the parties have separate
domiciles and no matrimonial home.65 It is submitted, however, that a test
denounced as unworkable for divorce recognition, 6  and discredited therein,
should like Phoenix from the flames, be revived in the sphere of essential
validity. It suffers from an imbued lack of certainty,67 a vital missing quality
in light of the significance of the marriage institution to the personal status
of the parties. As with the "most significant relationship" test of the
American Restatement Second of the Conflict of Laws, derided by Cavers,
60. Vervaeke, [1983] A.C. at 165.
61. The appellant had married for a second time in Italy, but unfortunately her "husband"
died at the reception that very evening. The appellant wished to inherit his property as a
"wife," but an obvious obstacle to this was the validity of her earlier marriage.
62. Vervaeke, [1983] A.C. at 165. The primary connection was to the lexfori, i.e., to
England.
63. See generally Lawrence, [1985] Fam. 106.
64. Entry Clearance Officer, Dhaka v. Ranu Begum [1986] Imm. A.R. 460.
65. See supra note 58. Fentiman has submitted that the approach is sociologically desirable
because, "it is best for the law of the place where a couple lead their married life to decide
whether or not they are legally married." See Fentiman, supra note 14 CAMBRIDGE L.J., at
277; Fentiman, supra note 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD., at 360.
66. See supra note 56.
67. See Davie, supra note 12, at 37.
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amongst others, it is tainted by the cryptic and question-begging nature of the
supposed test,68 allowing an undue extent of judicial ad hoc justice dressed
up as predicated on sound policy. The question of marital validity is not
conclusively answered, but rather the real and substantial connection test
"simply restates the problem."69 The uncertainty argument is cogent, as it is
possible for a real and substantial connection to point to more than one
jurisdiction, consequently obfuscating the appropriate law.7 ° The English
Law Commission has succinctly identified the demerits of the approach:
It is an inherently vague and unpredictable test which
would introduce an unacceptable degree of uncertainty into
the law. It is a test which is difficult to apply other than
through the courtroom process and it is therefore unsuitable
in an area where the law's function is essentially
prospective, i.e., a yardstick for future planning.71
4. Alternative Reference Theory and Exceptions to Orthodox Doctrine
It has been propounded that another viable test is a rule of alternative
reference for the purpose of validating a marriage: the marriage should be
held valid if it is valid under either the dual domicile test or the intended
matrimonial home test.72 Although such a choice of law rule would, of
course, result in more marriages being upheld, it was nonetheless rejected by
the Law Commission on the premise that it was wrong to elevate the general
policy in favor of upholding the validity of marriages into a governing rule.73
It is submitted such a test is devoid of merit and would result in an abdication
of the sensitive policy search for rational and structured choice of law
principles. It would be contrary to principle to adopt the dual domicile (or
68. See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 67 (1985).
69. See Davie, supra note 12, at 37.
70. PETER M. NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS IN COMMON LAW
JURISDICTIONS 36 (1993).
71. L.C.W.P. No. 89 (1985), para. 3-20. See generally North, Reform, but not Revolution.
General Course on Private International Law, vol. I. 220 Recuei Des Cours (1990), 9 at 66-
67.
72. See generally Jaffey, supra note 41.; (1982) 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 868; and see also
Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (1956), Cmnd. 9678, para. 891.
73. L..C.W.P. No. 89 (1985), at para. 3.37.
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the intended matrimonial home) test and then to refuse to give effect to it if
it results in the invalidity of the marriage.74
A further proposal which has been put forward,"5 that a marriage
should be regarded as essentially valid if it is valid by the law of the domicile
of either party at the time of the marriage, is subject to the same criticisms
as the alternative reference test. It comports to a rigid jurisdiction-selection
rule, attempting to buttress marital validity, but with no exploration of
selective choice of law issues relating to capacity. The Law Commission has
resiled from this approach in clear terms:
If it is accepted that a person's status is a matter of public
concern to the country in which he or she is domiciled at
the time of marriage, then the rules of that country which
are designed to protect its public interest (such as rules
laying down prohibited degrees of relationship or requiring
monogamy) should be given effect. The proposed rule
would enable a party to evade the requirements of his
domiciliary law and would also lead to limping
relationships.76
Although alternative reference tests have been rejected in English
law, a number of exceptions have developed to the primacy of the orthodox
dual domicile test. The emergence of these exceptions, which tend to
promulgate the explicit policy objectives of the lexfori, mirror the overthrow
of the general application in the United States of a lex loci delicti rule in tort
which occurred by judicial sleight of hand through selective use of
characterization," renvoi,78 and public policy.79 A significant exception was
74. See North, supra note 70, at 33.
75. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 576-78.
76. L.C.W.P. No. 89 (1985), at para. 3.38. The rejection of alternative reference tests has
left remaining the two orthodox theories of dual domicile and intended matrimonial home.
Exceptions may rarely apply on public policy grounds to retreat from the entrenched position.
See Scott v. Her Majesty's Attorney Gen. 11 PD 128 (P. 1886) (prohibition on remarriage);
Gray v. Formosa [1953] P 259 (inability to marry other than in accordance with the tenets of
a particular faith); and Chetti v. Chetti [ 1909] P. 67 (incapacity to marry outside one's caste.)
This public policy discretion is to be sparingly exercised. See Cheni v. Cheni, 3 All E.R. 873,
879 (P. 1962).
77. See Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A.2d 163 (Conn. 1928).
78. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
79. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528 (N.Y. 1961).
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created by the ruling in Sottomayer v De Barros (No. 2)80 which determined
that if a marriage is celebrated in England between parties one of whom has
an English and the other a foreign domicile, an incapacity imposed by the
foreign law but not by English law must be totally disregarded. This means
that effect will not be given to the foreign domiciliary law unless English law
also prohibits the marriage or unless the marriage is celebrated outside
England. In Sottomayer, the English court upheld the validity of a marriage
celebrated in England between first cousins, one of whom was domiciled in
England and the other in Portugal, despite the fact that at the time the law of
Portugal prohibited marriage between first cousins. The foreign incapacity
was ignored to promote policy objectives of the lex fori and to prevent
injustice to English domiciliaries because, "no country is bound to recognize
the laws of a foreign State when they work injustice to its own subjects.
' 81
Another exception has developed on pragmatic grounds to deal with
the incidental question whether priority is given to divorce recognition or
marital capacity provisions. Under section 50 of the Family Law Act of 1986
where a divorce or annulment has been granted by an English court, or is
recognized in England, it is treated as irrelevant that the divorce or
annulment may not be recognized elsewhere. The divorce or annulment shall
not prevent either party to the marriage from remarrying in England or cause
the remarriage of either party (irrespective of where the remarriage occurs)
to be denied invalidity in England. In effect, a marriage will be valid in
England despite the fact that under a party's domiciliary law the parties
lacked capacity to marry since their personal law refused to acknowledge a
divorce decree terminating the first marital union.82
As a final point, it seems that where the marriage is celebrated in
England both parties must have capacity under English law to enter into the
union.83 A marriage is likely to be held invalid in such a situation even
through the parties may have capacity under their domiciliary laws: "[O]ur
80. See Sottomayer v. DeBarros, 5 P.D. 94 (P. 1879).
81. See id. at 104. This rule applies to individuals domiciled in England who may not be
British subjects.
82. See discussion infra pp. 40-47.
83. See Breen v. Breen [1964] P. 144. See Reed v. Reed, [1969] 6 D.L.R. 617 (Can.) (for
contrasting Canadian decision where the court declined to apply the law of the place of
celebration to the issue of capacity.) See generally David Bradshaw, Capacity to Marry and
the Relevance of the Lex Loci Celebrationis in Commonwealth Law: A Conundrum Worthy
of a Dr. John Morris Seminar, 15 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 112 (1986); C.M.V. Clarkson,
Marriage in England: Favouring the Lex Fori, 10 LEGAL STUD. 80 (1990).
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courts can hardly be expected to uphold the validity of marriages which their
own law does not countenance. 84
B. The United States
The division by English law into compartments of formal and
essential validity that occurred during the nineteenth century15 marked a
pronounced schism in Anglo-American common law application. The rigid
approach in the United States, at least prior to the impact of interest analysis
theory and the proper choice of law uprising, has been a general reference
rule to the law of the place of celebration to all matters of marital validity.86
As Professor North has commented, efforts to combat evasion of mandatory
provisions, via the mechanism of the Uniform Marriage Act of 1912 and
similar legislation, proved largely nugatory in limiting the over-reaching
scope of the place of celebration rule.87 The only exceptions to such a broad
governing test developed embryonically through the public policy strictures
applied qua lexfori. In any event, as considered below, the great interest
analysis tornado in the United States that revolutionized choice of law
application in the fields of tort and contract, has swept past family law
matters leaving them relatively unscathed. The common law perspective in
the United States was succinctly stated by Chief Justice Winslow in Lanham
v. Lanham:
84. L.C.W.P. No. 89 (1985), at para. 3-42.
85. In 1861, the House of Lords drew a distinction between formal and essential validity.
The parties were English domiciliaries, and the wife was the sister of the husband's deceased
first wife. The marriage was celebrated in Denmark during a temporary visit to that country.
It was valid by Danish law but prohibited under English affinity rules. Place of celebration
was treated as determinative for formal validity but no longer ruled essential validity
according to the House of Lords. Lord Campbell opined, "But while the forms of entering
into the contract of marriage are to be regulated by the lex loci contractus, the law of the
country in which it is celebrated, the essentials of the marriage depend upon the lex domicilii,
the law of the country in which the parties are domiciled at the time of the marriage, and in
which the matrimonial residence is contemplated." Brook v. Brook, 9 H.L.C. at 207.
86. See North, supra note 70, at 25. See generally Reifschneider v. Reifschneider 89 N.E.
255 (111. 1909); In re Lando's Estate, 127 N.W. 1125 (Minn. 1910); Boysen v. Boysen 23
N.E.2d 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939), Great Northern R R.. Co. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683, (1918)
(upholding a marriage contracted by correspondence); Hardin v. Davis, 16 Ohio. Supp. 19
(1945) (upholding a proxy marriage).
87. See id.; North, supra note 8, at 22; EUGENE F. SCOLES AND PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 437 (1982).
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The general rule of law unquestionably is that a marriage valid
where it is celebrated is valid everywhere. To this rule, however,
there are two general exceptions which are equally well-
recognised, namely: (1) Marriages which are deemed contrary to
the law of nature as generally recognised by Christian civilized
states, and (2) marriages which the lawmaking powers of the
forum has declared shall not be allowed validity on the grounds
of public policy.88
State courts in the United States have demonstrated a degree of
genuflection in striking down unions on the premise that they offend the
public policy sensibilities of the forum.89 Polygamous and incestuous
marriages, which offend imbued state welfare concerns, have been denied
recognition.9" There is, however, a prevailing uncertainty over the types of
union to be stigmatized as constituting an incestuous relationship. 9 Unions
between ascendant and descendent, or between brother and sister, clearly fall
into this category, but vacillating decisions exist in relation to consanguinous
unions between aunt and nephew, uncle and niece, and to a lesser degree,
between first cousins. 92 There is also a lack of universal treatment to
marriage of individuals within a certain prescribed age limit without parental
consent, or consent of the appropriate guardian. 93 Difficulties also exist in
88. See 117 N.W. 787, 788 (1908). In effect, exceptions (1) and (2) are public policy
strictures on marriage that are applied qua lexfori.
89. See ROBERT F. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 531 (1968); EHRENZWEIG, supra
note 6, at 376-86; Joseph H. Beale, et al., Marriage and the Domicil, 44 HARV. L. REv. 501,
506 (1931).
90. See generally Earle v. Earle, 126 N.Y.S. 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910); In re Miller's
Estate, 214 N.W. 428 (Mich. 1927).
91. See Maddaugh, supra note 4, at 123-28.
92. See generally Stevenson v. Gray, 56 Ky. 193 (1856); In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d.
4 (1953); (providing examples of unions between uncles and nieces that were upheld). See
generally Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726 (Conn. 1961); State v. Brown, 23 N.E. 747
(Ohio 1890) (providing examples of unions between uncles and nieces that were denied
validity). See generally Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 577 (Ala. 1938) (marriage between an
aunt and nephew was similarly denied). See generally Weinberg v. Weinberg, 242 Ill. App.
414 (1926); Martin v. Martin, 46 S.E. 120 (W.Va. 1903) (first cousin marriages were denied).
See generally In re Miller's Estate, 214 N.W. 428; Leefield v. Leefield, 66 P. 953 (Pa. 1917)
(first cousin marriages upheld). See infra. pp. 48-55 (for fuller discussion on the policy issues
underlying these consanguinous relationships, and optimal choice of law).
93. See generally McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d. 163 (Cal. 1953); State v. Graves, 307
S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957) (adopting a place of celebration test). See generally Ross v. Bryant,
217 P. 364 (Okla. 1920); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1958); Sirois v. Sirois,
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treatment of penal state legislation with delimiting provisions affecting the
ability of parties to a divorce to remarry during the lifetime of the other
spouse,94 or prohibiting either spouse from remarrying within a specified time
after the divorce.95
Of extreme significance in surveying the landscape picture of United
States perspectives on marital validity is the impact of the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws. The Restatement
First, for which Joseph Beale acted as Reporter, and which appeared in 1934,
provides a broad affirmation and endorsement of the common law approach
that has been previously enunciated.96  Section 121 provides that, "...a
marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the
state where the contract of marriage takes place are complied with." 97
Exceptions to this governing rule are laid down in section 132 and consist of
the following matters: polygamous marriage, incestuous marriage of a degree
that offends a strong policy of the domicile, and a marriage of a domiciliary
that the domicile has made void by statute even though celebrated in another
state. 98 The triumvirate of presumptions is completed by the terms of section
122: "A marriage is invalid everywhere if any mandatory requirements of
the marriage law of the state in which the marriage is celebrated is not
complied with." 99
In the 37 years between the First and Second Restatement, there was
a well-documented fundamental revolution in the development of applicable
choice of law principles in the United States. Before assessing the marked
change of approach between the two Restatements in relation to marital
validity, it is instructive briefly to chart the altered general orthodoxy of
choice of law theoretical underpinnings. The place of celebration as a
general reference test represents a rigidjurisdiction-selection rule. In similar
vein is the English theory of dual domicile as a broad test for all matters of
50 A.2d 88 (N.H. 1946) (applying common domiciliary state law or public policy).
94. See generally State v. Shattuck, 38A. 81 (Vt. 1897); Commonwealthv. Lane, 113 Mass.
458 (1873); Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889); Wheelock v. Wheelock, 159 A.
665 (Vt. 1931).
95. See generally Horton v. Horton, 198 P. 1105 (Ariz. 1921); Harvey v. State, 238 P. 862
(Okla. 1925); Dudley v. Dudley, 130 N.W. 785 (Iowa 1911); Wright v. Wright, 162 N.E. 894
(Mass. 1928); Peters v. Peters, 276 P.2d 302 (Kan. 1954). See infra note 76 (for discussion
under English law).





N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
essential validity."'° By jurisdiction-selection what is meant is that, "they
require the court to apply the law of the country chosen by the private
international law rule irrespective of the content of the substantive rule of law
thereby selected."10 1  In contrast stands the process of rule-selection
technique promulgated in the intervening thirty-seven-year period between
the Restatements by leading United States commentators and developed by
the creativity of the judiciary. By this method emphasis is squarely placed
on a balancing exercise addressing the countervailing interests in the
application of a particular substantive rule of one legal system rather than a
quite different rule established by another legal system.1"2 The rule-selecting
approach, thus, requires the court to identify the particular issue and the legal
systems whose rules might be regarded as interested. This involves an
examination of the purposes and policies underlying the individual rules and
also of the interests of the states whose rules are in issue.
10 3
A false conflict occurs where only one state has an interest in having
its law applied, and consequently that will be the law adopted. In cases
where both states have an interest in their law being adopted, known as a true
conflict, then it is essential for the court to weigh the strengths of the
respective competing interests. 104 There is a lack of agreement amongst the
"revolutionaries" in the United States as to how this selection is to be
effected, and various rule-selection techniques have been propounded.
Currie would apply the law of the forum, looking to government interest
analysis and the lexfori.'°5 Baxter adopted comparative impairment that
100. See David F. Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in Amercian Perspective, in III
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 103 (1970)
(referring to them as state-selecting).
101. See NORTH, supra note 5, at 111.
102. See id.
103. See generally Fawcett, supra note 13.
104. See Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1233,
1242-43 (1963); RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 291-92
(1971); see also Cavers, supra note 98, at 100-102.
105. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963). Currie's theory was vividly exemplified by Cavers in his general course of lectures
given afthe Hague Academy in 1970:
A court asked to apply the law of a foreign state different from the
law of the forum should:
(1) Inquire into 'the policies expressed in the
respective laws' and the circumstances that may
render reasonable the application of those
policies, employing 'the ordinary processes of
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necessitates the court ascertaining which of the conflicting state's interests
would be more impaired if its policy were to be subjugated to the policy of
the other state. 106 Cavers' approach would involve the court in working out
principles of preference, meaning in essence, detailed choice of law rules for
"true conflict" situations.
10 7
Whilst the jurisdiction-selection technique is rigid and certain in
application, the rule-selection process is inherently flexible. The interest
construction and interpretation'.
(2) If only one State has an interest in the
application of its policy, apply the law of that
State.
(3) If the two States' interests appear in conflict,
consider whether 'a moderate and restrained
interpretation of one policy or interest of one
state or the other may avoid conflict'.
(4) If a conflict between the States' 'legitimate
interests' persists, apply the forum's law.
See Cavers, supra note 98, at 146-47. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 722
(Cal. 1976) (the paradigm case adopting governmental interest analysis and the lexfori). The
doctrine has been criticized on bases of uncertainty and difficulties intrinsic to the
determination of competing governmental interests and the balance between them. See AMOS
SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH To CHOICE OF LAW 221-24 (1970); see generally Gerhard
Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflicts of Laws and the American
Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 615 (1979); see generally DAVID C. JACKSON, THE
"CONFLICTS" PROCESS (1975).
106. See generally William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1963). This approach is not willing to apply the lexfori control of true conflicts. See
generally Offshore Rental Co. Inc. v. Cont'l Oil, 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978); Hall v. Univ. of
Nevada, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp., 155 Cal.
Rptr. 770, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (for illustration of application). Horowitz extended
Baxter's general proposition so that the law applied to true conflicts would be the state law
that had the most intense interest in relation to the particular dispute. See Horowitz, The Law
of Choice in California-A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV. 719, 755 (1974). But see Russell
J. Weintraub, The Future of Choice ofLaw For Torts: What Principles Should Be Preferred?,
41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 146, 158 (1977). Comparative impairment, "unless
supplemented by specific objective criteria, is unlikely to be a method that is cogent, feasible
to administer, and predictable." Id.
107. See generally Cavers, supra note 98; Cavers, supra note 102. The primary aim is to
do justice between the interested parties, and from these equitable principles, it is anticipated
more structured rules will develop as a consequence of judicial activity. See North, supra
note 5, at 122. See generally Neumeir v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972) (for formulation
of these principles). See Shapira, supra note 103, at 221-24 (for criticism on the bases of
ignoring the importance of forum law, territorialist bias, and lack of appreciation for private
interests). See Ehrenzweig, supra note 6, at 311; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex-Fori-Basic
Rule in the Conflicts of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REV. 637, 643-45 (1960) (in relation to
interpretation of forum policy).
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analysis approach, developed in the United States for tort and contract
disputes, has become affiliated with rule-skepticism whereby general choice
of law rules are disregarded in favor of a case by case judicial investigation
of the respective competing state interests. Professor Cavers has vividly
exemplified the question of choosing between ajurisdiction-selection or rule-
selection approach. "[S]hould a court in dealing with a claim that a foreign
law is applicable to the case before it or to an issue in that case choose
between its own and the foreign legal system or, instead, choose between its
own rule and the foreign rule?"10 8 The United States's answer is to come
down firmly in favor of rule-selection.
The Restatement Second of 1971 reflected the considerable interest
analysis revolution that infected United States choice of law principles during
the intervening period.109 It adopted as the primary test for choice of law the
law of the state that has the most significant relationship to the particular
issue. The identity of the state of most significant relationship is left very
much open for debate, but in section 6, the court is directed to consider the
following disparate considerations:
(1.) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2.) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include:
A. the needs of the interstate and international
systems,
B. the relevant policies of the forum,
C. the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue,
D. the protection of justified expectations,
E. the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law,
F. certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and
G. ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
108. See Cavers, supra note 98, at 122.
109. See North, supra note 5, at 125.
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The most significant relationship test, with a number of underlying
factors impacting upon choice, is applied in the Restatement to a whole host
of conflicts issues. The test is associated with Willis Reese, and in his terms,
is a specific issue-centered approach. "0 By section 283 of the Restatement
marital validity is determinable as follows:
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local
law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has
the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state
where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of
another state which has the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.
The marked difference between the First and Second Restatements
is that the latter, by section 283, acknowledges that the place of celebration
may not have the greatest interest in the evaluation of either matters of
formal or essential validity of a given marriage. It eschews a ritualistic
jurisdiction-selection test of place of celebration. One is ultimately left,
however, with the feeling that the conflicts upheaval in the United States has
virtually bypassed the area of marital validity. Although main family law
issues are covered in the Restatement Second, they are treated as
insignificant compared to choice of law for obligations. Tort and contract
require thirty-six and twenty-eight sections of coverage respectively, whereas
matters affecting status are only allocated eight sections in total."' This has
led Professor Baade to assert that, "I could not help feeling that I was dealing
with a stepchild. Professor Reese does not seem to have either an easy
110. Reese views the Restatement test as a catalyst towards the Utopian aim of clear and
definite rules for settlement of choice of law matters. He asserted, "I believe that one ultimate
goal, be it ever so distant, should be the development of hard-and-fast rules of choice of law.
I believe that in many instances these rules should be directed, at least initially, at a particular
issue. And I believe that in the development of these rules consideration should be given to
the basic objectives of choice of law, to the relevant local law rules of the potentially
interested states and, of course, to the contacts of the parties and of the occurrence with these
states." L. M. Reese, II Hague Recueil I, at 180 (1976). Shapira views it as "schizophrenic"
in trying to correlate a jurisdiction-selection structure with rule-selection interest analysis.
See Shapira, supra note 103, at 214.
111. See North, supra note 5, at 128.
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familiarity with, or a particularly keen interest in the law of divorce, and
especially the law of marriage."
1'1 2
It is all the more surprising that United States's interest analysis has
failed to greatly impact on this area given the issue specific questions that
accrue. Marriage as an institution is fundamental to society. Different states
have an interest in the relationship, and may seek to regulate status in a
variety of different forms by prohibiting certain marriages. In circumstances
where the parties are married and make their home in their common pre-
nuptial domicile, then only one state is interested. Often, however, a number
of competing states have an interest in the marriage when, for instance, the
parties are domiciled in different states prior to the marriage, or when the
marriage was celebrated in still another state, or where the parties effected
a change in domicile soon after the ceremony. It is self-evident that analysis
is required of the interests of these states in ruling on the validity or
otherwise of the union. Moreover, as well as the public interests of the
concerned countries, there will also be the interests of the respective parties
to the marriage. In marriage, contrary to the general position for most torts,
there is normally a degree of forethought involved, and an expectation that
their relationship will be validated. It is important that these expectations
should not be easily frustrated. Similarly, it is desirable that, to the greatest
extent possible, choice of law rules applicable to marriage ought to be as
clear, precise, and certain as possible. This is not simply so that the parties
can foretell with confidence the law governing their relationship, but also to
facilitate the task of marriage registrars, immigration officers, and social
security staff.' 3
It is submitted that what is required for the future is a more functional
approach to marital validity. At the outset it was intimated that interest
analysisper se is inadequate as a theoretical perspective to govern all matters
of capacity.' 1 4 The case by case development of interest analysis is eminently
uncertain, what was referred to as the special brand of casuistic "Khadi-
justiz" (ad hoc decisions deduced from mystical references to interests), and
dated rule-skepticism. A role does exist, however, for interest analysis on an
issue by issue basis rather than a case by case scenario. What is propounded
is a form of depecage whereby the main categories of essential validity are
demarcated, the wheat is separated from the chaff, and choice of law rules
recategorized to fit the specific matters. The five main categories, or
112. See Baade, supra note 15, at 380.
113. See generally Swan, supra note 6, at 16.
114. See supra note 13.
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impediments to marriage, have been stated to incorporate the following: non-
age, remarriage after divorce, consanguinity and affinity, polygamy, and lack
of consent. 15 These impediments need to be evaluated independently,
looking at the epicenter of competing public interest of different states as set
against the interest of the parties to the union. The aim of this re-
categorization is to formulate certain and predictable choice of law rules
which are molded to take account of the individualistic requirements of each
issue, eschewing broad jurisdiction-selection.'16 In order to obtain an
appropriate choice of law rule the focus will be on the teleological and
sociological basis for each particular impediment, a concentration upon
which law in reality has the most pertinent interest in the validity of the
marriage, and exploration of the underlying policy and social factors shaping
each rule.117 This approach, as we have already encountered,' 18has received
judicial support in England in the context of the validation of polygamous
marriages.
It is an over-simplification of the common law to assume
that the same test for purposes of choice of law applies to
every kind of incapacity-marriage, affinity, prohibition of
monogamous contract by virtue of an existing spouse, and
capacity for polygamy. Different public and social factors
are relevant to each of these types of incapacity. 19
In adopting a sensitive policy-oriented approach to issues of marital
validity it is hoped that optimal solutions can be reached for rule formulation.
These rules need to be as certain, appropriate, and simple as possible for the
benefit of all concerned parties. The five categories, suggested above, will
be considered sequentially, adopting an Anglo-American comparison of
relevant leading jurisprudence to arrive at preferred conclusions on
recategorized issue formulation. It will become evident that certain
resonances spin a not so subliminal thread. This perspective avoids the
scylla ofjurisdiction-selection on one side of the scales, and the charybdis of
case by case rule-selection at the other extreme. It is arguably a mature
115. See generally Jaffey, supra note 41; Downes, Recognition of Divorce and Capacity to
Remarry, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 170 (1986); North, supra note 70.
116. See North, supra note 70, at 37.
117. See Davie, supra note 12, at 39-45.
118. See infra p. 12; supra note 44.
119. Radwan, [1973] Fam. 35, at 51.
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solution to deal with a choice of law matter that has been appallingly
neglected on both sides of the Atlantic and is certainly ripe for a fresh
reconsideration.
III. THE IMPEDIMENT GROUNDS
A. Non-age
A myriad of underlying policy concerns are promulgated by a rule
prescribing a minimum age for marriage. There is a perceived need to
protect an immature individual from the hazards of a premature marriage.
120
It is in the public interest to prevent marriages that are likely to be unstable.
Additionally, a state has an interest in preventing its own domiciliaries from
sexually exploiting children. These interests were addressed in Pugh v.
Pugh, 1 21 the leading English authority on the issue.
In Pugh, a marriage was celebrated in 1946 in Austria between a
fifteen year-old girl domiciled in Hungary and a British army officer who,
although then stationed in Austria, was domiciled in England. England was
the place of the intended matrimonial residence. The young girl was a
refugee in Austria, having fled Hungary a year before the wedding was
solemnized. The parties lived together in various places where the husband
was stationed, eventually settling in England in 1950, whereupon the wife
petitioned for nullity on the ground of non-age. The petition was successful,
and the marriage was declared void. This was deemed to be the effect of
English statutory legislation on minimum age requirements. Under section
1 of the Age of Marriage Act of 1929, there was prohibited a marriage,
"between persons either of whom is under the age of sixteen." Thus, the
court decided that the Act had extraterritorial effect and was intended to,
"affect that capacity on all persons domiciled in the United Kingdom
wherever the marriage might be celebrated."' 22 The consequential outcome
was that the statute was interpreted as preventing an English domiciliary
from entering into a valid marriage if either spouse was under the minimum
age limit of sixteen. It was treated as irrelevant that the girl had capacity
under both Austrian and Hungarian law, the other interested legal systems in
the validity of the marriage, to enter into the union.
120. See Jaffey, supra note 41, at 45; Hartley, supra note 5, at 577; Smart, supra note 14,
at 230; North, supra note 44, at 57-69.
121. See generally Pugh, [ 1951 ] P. 482.
122. Id. at 493. See The Marriage Act of 1949, § 2.
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This decision has been subjected to adverse criticism in that it is
viewed as inappropriate to give extraterritorial paternal impact to English
law. 1 23 It was the policy of Hungarian law that sufficient protection was
afforded to its nationals by permitting them to avoid their marriage before
they obtained seventeen years of age. The wife had not effected this and
indeed a child had been born to the union.1 24 In such circumstances it has
been legitimately asked, "was it really the object of the statute to protect
middle-aged English colonels from the wiles of designing Hungarian
teenagers?" 125 There has been further opprobrium in that the decision failed
to appreciate the competing policy objectives of interested states. An interest
analysis approach has been propounded as achieving a better outcome.
126
Smart has submitted that English law had no reason to invalidate the
marriage because the English domiciliary was old enough to marry. There
was also no reason to invalidate the marriage by Hungarian law as the
Hungarian domiciliary had capacity. 127  Hence the case is viewed as
involving a "false conflict," even though England was the intended
matrimonial residence.
128
In order to establish the most esculent rule for non-age, best
aesthetically suited for the impediment, it is important to explore further the
policy objectives that are implicated. As far as English marriage law policy
is concerned they were expounded in Pugh v. Pugh by Justice Pearce in the
following terms:
According to modern thought it is considered socially and
morally wrong that persons of an age, at which we now
believe them to be immature and provide for their
education, should have the stresses, responsibilities and
sexual freedom of marriage and the physical strain of
childbirth. Child marriages are by common consent
believed to be bad for the participants and bad for the
institution of marriage. Acts making carnal knowledge of
young girls an offence are an indication of modern views
on this subject. The remedy that 'the Parliament' has
123. See MCCLEAN, supra note 16, at 159; see also Fentiman, supra note 14 at 256.
124. See Clarkson and Hill, supra note 16, at 323.
125. MCCLEAN, supra note 16, at 159.
126. See generally Fentiman, supra note 14 at 256; Fentiman, supra note 14 at 353.
127. See Smart, supra note 14, at 233-34.
128. See id.
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resolved for this mischief and defect is to make marriages
void where either of the parties is under sixteen years of
age. 129
In protecting an individual from the hazards of a premature marriage
it seems inconceivable that English policy concerns ought to extend to
foreigners from other states, whose own peculiar domiciliary law deem them
as lacking any requirement of protection. The cathartic aim of excluding all
marital instability is undoubtedly a noble sentiment, but in reality, it is only
implicated where the parties establish a matrimonial residence within the
relevant lexfori. This occurred in Pugh as the parties did come eventually
to live in England; a ground which some believe may justify the outcome of
invalidity. 3° However, this perspective seems unduly paternalistic and
chauvinistic in that English law is seeking to prescribe the age of maturity for
an individual who before the marriage belongs to a foreign legal system. In
such a situation due regard should generally be accorded to the social mores
and culture of the country to which the party actually belongs, to which they
are immolated, and which has legitimately determined that person has
sufficient maturity to marry. The issue of maturity is best left to be
determined by the pre-nuptial domiciliary law of whichever country the
individual belongs; if Hungary has determined a girl of fifteen can marry, or
Nigeria that thirteen is apposite, or in South American countries such as
Columbia and Paraguay that boys can marry at fourteen and twelve for girls,
and this judgement is respected by members of its own community, then
validation of the marriage should not infringe English policy concerns even
where the matrimonial residence is established in England.131 This approach
demonstrates an appreciation of international comity (state comity at the
lower level), and shows an enlightened perspective on a shifting development
of national child maturity levels that is not out of kilter with modem times.
In essence, the point is that:
since children may develop socially and emotionally, and even
physically, at different rates in different environments, it seems
sensible for English law to rely on the judgement of the law of
the country to which a party belongs for the decision whether he
or she is mature enough to marry.
129. See Pugh, [1951] P., at 492.
130. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 577.
131. See generally Jaffey, supra note 41, at 45-46.
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As we have seen in Pugh, the English rule, by which a marriage is
void if either party is under sixteen, applied to invalidate a marriage where
a husband, aged over sixteen, was domiciled in England, while the wife, aged
fifteen, was domiciled in a country by whose law the marriage was valid. It
is submitted that this perfunctory outcome cannot be supported by the
underlying policy objectives that apply to non-age. The appropriate choice
of law rule to govern this particular impediment is that a marriage will only
be invalid if either party is below the permitted age according to the pre-
nuptial domiciliary law of that party at the time that the marriage occurs.
This more liberal choice of law rule132 would have led to marital validity in
Pugh and is generally conducive to a presumption of marital validity, whilst
being sensitive to the policy-orientated interests of respective states. It
obviates any role being generally applied to the laws of the matrimonial
home, although, as suggested below, exceptions may apply in very limited
cases on the basis of overriding public policy considerations qua lex fori.
The proposed test has the advantage of dealing satisfactorily with hard cases
involving separate pre-nuptial domiciles but no established matrimonial
home. Overall, it represents the optimal solution to deal with this ground of
marital invalidity.
It was accepted as a valid approach in Mohamed v. Knott, 33 a case
where both spouses were Nigerian and domiciled in Nigeria when they
married. At the time of the marriage, the husband was twenty-six, but the
wife only thirteen, the marriage being valid under Nigerian law, even though
the parties came to live in England some three months after the marriage. It
was determined that the marriage would be recognized in England as a valid
marriage; under the prenuptial domiciliary laws of the parties there was
capacity to enter into the union.
In the United States, there is a paucity of leading cases on the matter
of non-age.134 The two main authorities commonly referred to are Wilkins v.
Zelichowski35 and State of Arkansas v. Graves.1 36 They demonstrate an
132. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 577. The law is more liberal than the outcome in Pugh,
but less so than an intended matrimonial home test referring to only one system of law, and
less liberal than Hartley's alternative reference test that a marriage be valid if so under either
party's domiciliary law. See id.
133. Mohamed v. Knott, I Q.B.1 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1969).
134. See supra note 93.
135. See generally Wilkins, 140 A.2d 65 (1958).
136. See generally Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545 (1957).
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unwelcome degree of judicial atavism and a polarity in choice of law
sensitivities.1 37 It has been suggested herein that a suitable Anglo-American
choice of law rule for non-age is that a marriage should only be held invalid
on the ground of lack of age if a party is too young by the law of his or her
own domicile at the time of the marriage. In order to test the functionality
of this perspective, and to invest it with a patina of intellectual respectability,
it is illuminating to apply it to the aforementioned jurisprudence of the
United States to see if it is logically compelling.
The decision in Wilkins v. Zelichowski, represents the paradigmatic
textbook case of runaway under-age marriage. The parties were domiciled
in New Jersey. They wished to marry, but the girl, aged sixteen, was under
the minimum age of eighteen imposed by New Jersey policy marriage
requirements. Accordingly, the couple ran away to Indiana where they went
through a ceremonial marriage because "it was the quickest place" and where
females of sixteen were capable of marriage.'38 After the ceremony, they
returned immediately to New Jersey to make their home, and a child was
born ten months later. As it transpired the birth of the child marked the final
happy event for the marital union for very soon thereafter the defendant
husband was convicted of several car thefts and was placed in a reformatory.
The plaintiff thereupon brought an action for annulment in New
Jersey. The intermediate appellate court'3 9 determined that an annulment
would be in the best interests of the woman and of the couple's child, but
ruled that under New Jersey conflicts rules, the laws of Indiana, as the state
of place of celebration, served to give the couple capacity to marry. In such
circumstances, the intermediate appellate court refused to annul the marriage.
This judgement was reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
No immutable rules were stated to apply to this choice of law matter; rather,
it undertook an independent analysis of the facts in issue. This new review
of the facts revealed that the only interests of Indiana related to conformity
with their requirements on ceremonial formalities. It was the law of New
Jersey that was found to be the only factor relevant to the selection of a law
to govern capacity."' Prominent mention was also made by the court of its
137. See Baade, supra note 15, at 359-361; Maddaugh, supra note 4, at 133; Fine, supra
note 15, at 39-40; North, supra note 5, at 146-150.
138. Note, The Formalities Essential to a Valid Marriage in Indiana, 34 IND. L.J. 643
(1958-59).
139. See generally Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 129 A.2d 459 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
140. See Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 68 (N.J. 1958).
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belief that the annulment would be in the best interests of the child, and by
reason of a New Jersey statute would not make the child illegitimate.
The central tenet of the decision, expressed in the following passage
from the court judgement, was that the strong public policy of New Jersey
was applicable and remained determinative even though the marriage itself
occurred elsewhere:
It is undisputed that if the marriage between the plaintiff
and the defendant had taken place here, the public policy of
New Jersey would be applicable and the plaintiff would be
entitled to the annulment; and it seems clear to us that if
New Jersey's public policy is to remain at all meaningful it
must be considered equally applicable though their
marriage took place in Indiana. While that state was
interested in the formal ceremonial requirements of the
marriage it had no interest whatever in the marital status of
the parties. Indeed, New Jersey was the only State having
any interest in that status, for both parties were domiciled
in New Jersey before and after their marriage and their
matrimonial domicile was established here. The purpose
in having the ceremony take place in Indiana was to evade
New Jersey's marriage policy and we see no just or
compelling reason for permitting it to succeed.'41
The decision in Wilkins v. Zelichowski is representative of an
orthodox approach to non-age.'42 In a situation where the state of common
domicile imposes a more restrictive age requirement than the state of
celebration, and the courts are not directed to decide otherwise by local
statute, they have tended to universally invalidate young persons' marriages
as contradicting their strong public policy.' This has been in circumstances
where the parties have returned to live in their original domiciliary state.
141. Id. at 67-68.
142. See Bays v. Bays, 174 N.Y.S. 212, 217 (Sup. Ct., Cortland Cty. 1918); Portwood v.
Portwood, 109 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (upholding the validity of the marriage
contract in the converse situation of validity under the consorts common domicile law, but
invalidity under place of celebration).
143. See Fine, supra note 15, at 38.
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A mirror image of Wilkins v. Zelichowski is the Oklahoma case of
Ross v. Bryant144 that involved another run-away underage marriage. A girl,
aged fourteen, decamped with her boyfriend from her parents' home in
Oklahoma to Arkansas where the young couple married. The girl satisfied
the minimum age requirements of the place of celebration. The parties then
returned to Oklahoma, their pre-nuptial domiciliary states, and sought to
reside together. The Oklahoma Court annulled their "marriage" on policy
grounds. There was an underlying concern for regulating the age at which
young Oklahomans might begin to form new family units within the state
borders. The primacy of the interests of the state of domicile was clearly
paramount,1 45 and overrode any state of celebration presumptions.
By way of contrast, it is interesting to examine State ofArkansas v.
Graves,146 decided just a few months before the decision of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Wilkins v. Zelichowski. The cases are totally
contradictory in outcome and approach. The interested parties were all
resident and domiciled in Arkansas. The thirteen-year-old girl and her
seventeen-year-old husband left Arkansas to marry in Mississippi with the
consent of their parents, and then they immediately returned to Arkansas to
live. Their marriage was valid under the subsisting law of the place of
celebration, but both parties were under age according to the law of
Arkansas, their pre-nuptial domiciliary law. Subsequently the parents of the
thirteen-year-old girl were prosecuted for the offense of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor on the premise that the parents had consented to her
entering a wholly void marriage. The crucial issue thus focused upon the
validity of the marriage. In a perplexing decision, the validity of the
marriage was acceded to by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The general
presumption was to apply a place of celebration rule unless displaced by an
Arkansas statutory provision declaring void a marriage validly entered into
in another state, or unless the marriage offended the strong public policy of
Arkansas. 147
As to the former no such statutory provision existed, and as to the
latter the court concluded, "there is no strong public policy in this State
requiring the courts to declare that marriages such as the one involved here
are void ab initio."'148 An unsatisfactory outcome was reached by the
144. See generally Ross, 217 P. 364.
145. See generally Sirois, 50 A.2d 88.
146. See generally Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545.
147. See id. at 550.
148. Id. at 549.
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adoption of a rigid and inappropriate jurisdiction-selection rule. 49 The
adoption of a choice of law rule referring all matters of essential validity to
the law of the place of celebration seems the apotheosis of absurdity.
Children who were resident and domiciled in Arkansas, who briefly visited
Mississippi to solemnize a marriage, and then returned to their original state,
were able to contumeliously disregard the social mores and culture of the
state to which the parties belonged and had determined that they had
insufficient maturity to marry therein.
The test propounded herein is to apply a choice of law rule for non-
age that applies the domicile law of the respective parties. It has been
suggested that a marriage will only be invalid if either party is below the
permitted age according to the pre-nuptial domiciliary law of that party at the
time that the marriage occurs. The application of this test would have
provided a suitable panacea to the unwelcome outcome in State ofArkansas
v. Graves. The parties under their pre-nuptial domiciliary law of Arkansas,
lacked capacity to marry because they failed to meet the minimum age
requirement, and thus, cadit quaestio, their "marriage" in Mississippi would
be declared invalid. This result would not be replicated by applying the
Restatement Second which, as we have seen, applies a place of celebration
test subject to displacement where the strong public policy of the state of
most significant relationship is infringed. On the facts it is clear that
Arkansas would be the state of most significant relationship, but as held by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, there was no prevailing strong public policy
requirement to strike down the valid union under the place of celebration test,
nor was any marriage evasion statute enacted. The preferred rule-selection
test adduced in this section would also legitimately precipitate marital
invalidity in Wilkins v. Zelichowski in the run-away marriage scenario, where
the parties fruitlessly attempted to evade ante-nuptial domiciliary law. 50
In very limited cases, the general ante-nuptial domicile rule-selection
test may need to be ameliorated to deal with public policy concerns of the lex
fori where the parties set up their matrimonial residence within state borders.
An illustration of the need for this flexible discretion is illustrated under
English law by the example where the marriage of a child below the age of
149. See generally Samuel Bare, Significance of Puberty in Nonage Marriages, 16 WASH.
AND LEE L REV. 87 (1959).
150. This would arguably also be the outcome under the test of the Second Restatement.
The marriage was valid under the place of celebration, Indiana, but by the proviso to § 283
(2), it would be invalid if it violated the strong public policy of New Jersey. According to
Reese, this self-evidently would be the case with public policy leading to non-recognition.
See Reese, supra note 108, at 166-71. See also North, supra note 5, at 147.
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puberty is valid by the law of her domicile, but nonetheless English public
policy qua lexfori would intervene to invalidate the foreign marriage where
the matrimonial residence was established within the territory.15 1 Apart from
these rare cases the ante-nuptial dual domicile rule should apply, even to
"child" marriages as in Mohamed v. Knott.
The marriage was declared valid in this case, quite correctly it is
suggested, even though the thirteen-year-old Nigerian girl with her twenty-
six-year-old husband came to live in England. There may be associated other
difficulties incumbent to the relationship, such as compliance with regular
school attendance, welfare concerns over whether the young girl needs to be
taken into care, and matters of criminal law including whether liability be
imposed if sexual intercourse occurs,'52 but these are separate concerns
facilitated by wholly different policy issues then the initial question of
marital validity.'53
What about the converse situation to Pugh v. Pugh where a young
female domiciliary, under the minimum age of marriage according to her
domiciliary law, marries an older man abroad and establishes a matrimonial
home in a state by whose law the marriage is valid? Should the rule-
selection choice of law test of ante-nuptial domicile law still apply where the
link to domicile is more attenuated? 15 4 In this regard Dr Cheshire stated:
If a girl aged fourteen wishes, contrary to the law of
England, to marry a foreigner domiciled in a country whose
law permits marriage at this early age, it may justifiably be
doubted whether there is any defensible ground upon which
English law can regard the union as void. The social life of
England is unaffected, for the girl loses her connection with
this country upon the acquisition of her husband's
domicile. '
Despite the above analysis, and with respect to Dr Cheshire, his
perspective fails to recognize that a key aspect of the policy underlying the
151. See Jaffey, supra note 41, at 46.
152. This issue was left unresolved in Mohamed v. Knott, but Lord Parker C.J. opined that
it was unlikely that a successful prosecution could be commenced by the police. See
Mohamed, 1 Q.B. at 10.
153. See CLARKSON AND HILL, supra note 16, at 322-25.
154. See Smart, supra note 14, at 234.
155. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (1935); see also CHESHIRE AND P.M.
NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (10th ed. 1979).
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impediment of non-age is to protect young people whom their domiciliary
states consider to be insufficiently mature to lead a normal married life, and
to safeguard them from being led astray or even taken from their homes.
Suppose, for example, that a Texan girl of thirteen marries a Colombian in
Colombia, and the parties settle there after their "marriage." Or suppose that
an English girl of fifteen marries an Austrian in circumstances where place
of celebration and matrimonial residence coincide. In each hypothetical
situation the "marriage" ought to be invalid. The purpose of the non-age
rule, unlike impediments of polygamy or consanguinity, is not simply
concerned with protecting the public interest but looks to the personal
interest of the immature party in circumventing the dangers of premature
marriage. 1 6 Upholding the marriage would defeat the requisite policy
objective, and a dual ante-nuptial domicile test should reign supreme for this
specific issue.
B. Marriage and Divorce Recognition: The Incidental Question
The essence of this article has been to argue that it is realistic to
construct a coherent approach to choice of law in the area of validity of
marriage through depecage, splitting down the traditional category into
smaller units, each restricted to genuinely related issues. It has been
propounded that for each delineated category there needs to be a separate
connecting factor designed to make a policy-based link between all the
related issues in the category and the abstractly defined state whose law is to
apply.157 One area of Anglo-American law where this pragmatic approach
has already become supererogatory is where the rules for the recognition of
foreign divorce or annulment come into conflict with the choice of law rules
relating to capacity and bigamy,'58 raising directly what is known as an
156. An English docimiciliary cannot avoid the incapacity to marry by changing her
domicile, for she does not acquire capacity to change her domicile until she is either 16 or
validly married.
157. See generally Downes, supra note 113; see K. Lipstein, Recognition of Divorces,
Capacity to Marry, Preliminary Questions and Depecage, 35 INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 178, 182
(1986).
158. Private international law cases involving bigamous marriages are hard to find as it is
rare for a second marriage ceremony to transpire without any prior effort to officially end the
first marriage. However, it seems clear that capacity to effect the second marriage is a matter
for the law of the ante-nuptial domicile. See generally Prawdic-Lazarska, 1954 S.C. 98.
More significant are authorities involving an earlier divorce or annulment followed by a
second marriage. See generally North, supra note 70, at 38.
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incidental question.159 The response has been to fashion a specific preference
in favor of upholding the validity of the later marriage through primacy
attached to divorce recognition. 160  The traditional category of marriage
validity, the orthodox dual domicile rule, has been superseded in England
through rectification achieved by statutory legislation contained in section 50
of the Family Law Act of 1986;161 in the United States recategorization has
occurred through divorce recognition rules being established at a federal
rather than a state level 62 and via the mechanism of characterization
facilitated by judicial sleight of hand to redefine the associated issues.
163
This functional perspective on choice of law rule-selection has been applied
adventitiously to a separate category of validity, and represents a template for
other areas. It avoids the stultifying effect of a rigid and often inappropriate
jurisdiction-selection rule being applied to all issues of capacity.164 Prior to
the rectification of English principles by the Family Law Act of 1986, the
leading case addressing the issue of priority between divorce recognition and
capacity to marry was Lawrence v. Lawrence,165 an authority that succinctly
highlighted the ambit of the problem raised by the incidental question.
In Lawrence, there was an explicit clash between the choice of law
rules to determine the validity of the second marriage and those for
recognition of a foreign divorce. 166 The wife, a Brazilian national and
159. The issue of the incidental question is succinctly defined by Clarkson and Hill. See
CLARKSON AND HILL, supra note 16, at 239. "An incidental question arises when one
country's conflict rules lead to a foreign law, but under that law an incidental or subsidiary
question arises which can only be resolved by an application of a further conflicts rule
governing that incidental question. The issue is whether that incidental question should be
governed by the conflicts rule of the foreign law (the lex causae approach) or the conflicts
rule of the forum (the lexfori approach)." Id.
160. See generally MCCLEAN, supra note 16, at 160-63; NORTH AND FAWCETT, supra note
16, at 603-05.
161. See generally A.J.E. Jaffey, The Incidental Question and Capacity to Remarry, 48
MOD. L. REv. 465 (1985); A. Briggs, Conflict of Laws: Postponing the Future?, 9 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 251.
162. See Baade, supra note 15, at 342-43.
163. See Fine, supra note 15, at 31.
164. See North, supra note 70., at 38.
165. See generally Lawrence, [19851 Fam. 106. The decision promulgated a great degree
of academic comment. See generally J.G. Collier, Conflict of Laws-Foreign Divorces and
Capacity to Marry--Judiciary and Jurists, [ 1985] CAMBRIDGEL.J. 378; P.B. Carter, Capacity
to Remarry After a Foreign Divorce, 101 L.Q.R. 496 (1985); P.B. CARTER, THE BRITISH
YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1986, 441 (1987); Jaffey, supra note 41 at 160;
Downes, supra note 113; Lipstein, supra note 156.
166. See Smart, supra note 14, at 238-39.
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domicile of that country, married Robert Harley in Brazil. Subsequently, the
couple separated and the wife conducted a second marriage ceremony with
the petitioner in Nevada. Immediately before the marriage ceremony in
Nevada the wife had obtained a divorce from her first husband in a Nevada
District Court. This Court had taken jurisdiction on the basis of the wife's
"domicile" in the state. Under Nevada law, the fact that she had resided in
Las Vegas for more than six weeks was a sufficient foundation for
jurisdiction under the law of Nevada. There was no dispute that this divorce
was entitled to recognition in English law under the existing divorce
legislation.167 However, there was also no dispute that the wife's ante-nuptial
domicile was Brazil, and under that law, her Nevada divorce would not be
recognized since in that country marriage is regarded as indissoluble. Thus,
the decree would be treated as if it were a mere judicial separation. The
couple moved to England, whereupon the husband petitioned for a
declaration that the marriage between him and the wife, which had been
celebrated in Nevada in 1970, was valid and subsisting. This petition was
contested by the wife on the ground that at the time of the marriage she
lacked capacity to enter into the Nevada marriage.
As Downes has stated,'68 the case raised a classic incidental question
for the English court.'69 The capacity to marry conflicts rules pointed to the
lex causae being applied, the Brazilian domiciliary law of the wife, by which
the second marriage was invalid. On the opposite side of the coin, the
conflicts rule for divorce recognition intimated that the lexfori provisions be
applied, by whose terms the first marriage had been validly dissolved
allowing the second marriage to be validly conducted. 7° By applying both
sets of private international law rules the bizarre conclusion would be that
she was a single woman who was incapable of remarrying. Prior case
precedents were of little help in resolving the dispute given the degree of
vicissitudes contained therein.' 7'
Both the trial court and the English Court of Appeal upheld the
validity of the second marriage. At first instance, Justice Lincoln
circumnavigated the incidental question altogether by determining that the
wife's capacity to remarry was governed not by the law of her domicile but
167. See Downes, supra note 113, at 171.
168. See id.
169. See supra note 158.
170. See generally A.H. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERISATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 149
(1940); A.V. LEVONTIN, CHOICE OF LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS 91 (1976).
171. See generally Shaw, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 55 (1868); Brentwood, 2 Q.B. 956 (1968);
Padolecchia, [1968] P. 314; In the Marriage of Barrigia (No. 2), 7 Fain. L.R. 909 (1981).
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by the law of the intended matrimonial home, the law of the country with
which the marriage had its most real and substantial connection. 72 The
result, but not the reasoning, was followed by the Court of Appeal 73 who
applied a novel solution. Primacy was accorded to the specific English rules
on recognition of foreign divorce, and under those rules the wife was entitled
to have her Nevada divorce recognized. Since the wife was treated by the lex
fori as a single woman her later marriage was permissible and could not be
declared void on the ground of her bigamy. The lex fori provisions
consequently reigned supreme over the lex causae Brazilian conflicts rule on
recognition of foreign divorce. 174 Interestingly in the converse situation an
Ontario court'75 upheld the validity of a second marriage where the divorce
was recognized under the lex causae (the wife's domiciliary law) but not
under Ontario divorce recognition principles.
The predominance accorded to divorce recognition over capacity
rules, implicitly established in Lawrence to resolve the incidental question, 
176
was explicitly adopted a year later by the English Parliament. Section 50 of
the Family Law Act of 1986 provided:
172. Indyka, [1969] 1 A.C. 33 (extending to the area of capacity to marry a test used
previously only for recognition of divorce, under the old common law rules, and nullity
decrees). See also Law v. Gustin [1976] Fam. 155.
173. See Lawrence v. Lawrence, [1985] Fain. 106.
174. See Downes, supra note 113, at 172-73.
175. See generally Schwebel v. Ungar, 42 D.L.R. (2d) 622 (Ont. Ct. App. 1963); Schwebel
v. Ungar, 48 D.L.R. (2d) 644 (Can. 1964); K. Lysyk, Conflict of Laws-Status-Capacity to
Marry-Recognition of Prior Foreign Divorce-The Incidental Question, 43 CAN. BAR. REV.
363 (1965). In this case a husband and wife, both Jewish, were initially Hungarian
domiciliaries. They decided to emigrate to Israel, but whilst on route effected divorce
proceedings in Italy through the Jewish ghet process; separate domiciles were then acquired
in Israel. Subsequently, the wife entered into a second marriage in Ontario during a
temporary stay therein; the earlier ghet process effectively dissolved the first union under
Israeli law, but not in accordance with Ontario divorce recognition principles. However, the
validity of the second marriage was upheld on the premise that immediately prior to the
remarriage the wife's status by her domiciliary law was that of a single person. Capacity rules
were given primacy over state divorce recognition. See id.
176. Davie has argued that the issue of remarriage after divorce (and also polygamy) should
be tested by the law of the matrimonial domicile. In his view where there is no matrimonial
domicile, reference should be made to the parties' ante-nuptial domiciliary laws on the
premise that one of these states will in all probability, become the matrimonial domicile. If
both domiciles concur on this issue, their provisions are determinative. In the case of
conflict, the presumption of marital validity should be used and the marriage declared valid.
See Davie, supra note 12, at 50-52.
426 [Vol. 20
ESSENTIAL VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
Where, in any part of the United Kingdom: (a) a divorce or
annulment has been granted by a court of civil jurisdiction,
or (b) the validity of a divorce or annulment is recognised
by virtue of this Part, the fact that the divorce or annulment
would not be recognised elsewhere shall not preclude either
party to the marriage from re-marrying in that part of the
United Kingdom or cause the remarriage of either party
(wherever the remarriage takes place) to be treated as
invalid in that part.
The English pragmatism in this area has been replicated in the United
States through the functional establishment of federal rules covering divorce
recognition and capacity to remarry. Baade177 has enunciated three deeply
entrenched rules of constitutional magnitude that govern divorce recognition.
First, there exists an autonomous power of the domiciliary state of one of the
spouses to unilaterally dissolve a marriage ex. parte, with no subsisting
requirement for the establishment of jurisdiction over the respondent
spouse. 17 8 Second, a divorce obtained in ex. parte circumstances remains
vulnerable to collateral attack in the domiciliary state of the respondent
spouse on the premise that domicile was inaccurately adjudged to prevail in
the original set of proceedings.179 Third, if both parties have appeared in the
original proceedings, an interpartes divorce process, then any divorce based
on the jurisdictional touchstone of domicile is binding on sister states to the
same degree as it is in the state which rendered the original decree. 8 '
As far as the recognition of foreign country divorces is concerned, no
distinction is made in the Second Restatement between sister state and
international conflicts in the divorce sphere. It is assumed without demur
that foreign and sister-state connecting factors rankparipassu, but similarly
that recognition of foreign country divorces should, mutatis mutandis, be
ruled by the same principles as govern the recognition of sister-state
divorces.' There is enshrined here a rule for divorce recognition,
superseding any choice of law issues of capacity, which is jurisdiction-
177. See Baade, supra note 15, at 342-43.
178. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), summarized in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 71, 73 (1971).
179. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
180. See generally Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), summarized in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 73 (1971).
181. See Baade, supra notel5, at 345.
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selective within the constitutional framework. It is predicated upon
universality as to the meaning of "domicile," and embodies a presumption in
favor of the automatic application of the lexfori in divorce cases that mirrors
the English development. The rules provide a certainty of approach that is
logically compelling within a hierarchical structure.'
Outside of the federal sphere, courts in the United States have
demonstrated a palpable degree ofjudicial creativity in accepting that whilst
a marriage can be valid for one specific purpose, it can be invalid for another.
In the context of the inter-relationship between conflicts rules on divorce
recognition and capacity to remarry, the decisions in Estate of Borax v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 183 and In re Ommang's Estate184 reveal a
perceptible judicial re-categorization of relevant issues. The courts have
indulged in a form of characterization to achieve a preferred outcome.
In Estate of Borax v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a divorce
was obtained by the husband from his first wife in the liberal divorce state of
Mexico. He soon remarried, but this latter marriage was challenged by his
first wife before the New York courts on the premise that because the New
York courts would not recognize the earlier divorce then the second marriage
was invalid. This declaration was granted in the terms requested by the first
wife. The declaration itself was treated as a brutumfulmen by the husband
and the second wife who lived together and claimed tax deductions on the
basis that they were validly married. Subsequently, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue claimed payment of tax underpaid through invalid claims
for married person's allowance. However, in an infelicitous although
logically compelling judgement, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit determined that they were prepared, despite the pre-existing
New York decision, to view the Mexican divorce as valid and the second
marriage, therefore, also valid for tax purposes. Res judicata was
inapplicable. A bifurcated perspective was reached on divorce recognition
and capacity to remarry determinable upon whether the issue in question was
categorized as one pertaining to marital status or tax law. A radical parsing
of the doctrine of precedent was outcome determinative.
A similar judicial recategorization occurred in In re Ommang's
Estate. The parties, who wished to marry, were originally Wisconsin
domiciliaries, but were barred from marriage since the woman had received
182. See generally Swan, supra note 6, at 17.
183. 349 F. 2d 666 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966). See Currie, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 26, 64-75 (1966).
184. 235 N.W. 529 (1931).
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a divorce within the past year. To circumvent this prohibition, they married
in Minnesota, where the marriage was valid and returned straightaway to
Wisconsin where they resided together for just under two years.
Unfortunately, the union broke down and they separated, with the man
establishing a new home in Minnesota, and some time later the "wife" went
to live in that state with her daughter by a former marriage. Although the
parties met on a number of occasions thereafter, they did not live together.
Upon the man's death, the woman sought to administer his estate claiming
that she was his widow. The decedent's half-sister contested this succession
claim. She strenuously argued that the "marriage" would have been invalid
by the Wisconsin courts because their domiciliaries had sought to evade their
personal law. The woman lacked capacity because of lack of earlier divorce
recognition under her ante-nuptial domicile law. However, the Minnesota
court, mindful of the pre-eminent succession rights of the putative wife,
determined in her favor. The court applied the "general rule that a marriage
valid where performed is valid everywhere." In real terms, the court
bypassed marital validity issues to effect a beneficial property resolution.1 85
In summary, the choice of law response in this area has been
pragmatically to fashion a preference in favor of upholding the validity of the
later marriage through primacy attached to divorce recognition. Where the
rule for recognition of foreign divorce or annulment comes into conflict with
the choice of law rule relating to capacity and bigamy, then the former has
prevailed. In English law the lexfori dominates this issue through the impact
of statutory legislation. In the United States, the synergistic effect of federal
law and judicial recategorization have achieved a similar outcome. The
single jurisdiction-selection rule for all matters of essential validity has been
disregarded in this matter, and replaced by a compartmentalized perspective
that is issue specific. 186 It should form a catalyst for policy-orientated reform
of other impediment grounds to marital validity.
185. See generally Reese, supra note 5.
186. See North, supra note 70, at 38.
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C. Consanguinity and Affinity
If the ideas of men in various parts of the civilized world
with respect to the classes of persons to, or between, whom
marriage should be forbidden, were uniform it would be
necessary, in any given case, merely to inquire whether the
requisite means of manifesting assent to becoming married
had been used.'87
There are significant disparities between countries regarding the
degree of cogent marriage restrictions imposed on related individuals. These
impediments may apply not simply to blood relationships (consanguinity),
but also to relationships established by marriage (affinity). The English
response has been to adopt a rigid jurisdiction-selection test of dual domicile
to both questions of consanguinity and affinity. 88 The jurisprudence of the
United States reveals a startling vacillation in approach to the prohibited
degrees of relationship matter.' 89 It is submitted that a novel governing rule
can beneficially be universally adopted that is policy sensitive to the different
countervailing issues that are manifested. There arguably needs to be a
demarcation of choice of law principles; an aesthetic distinction between
prohibition on the ground of consanguinity, as opposed to invalidity that is
predicated upon the affinity rules.
The policy behind invalidation of marriage on consanguinous
grounds is to prevent relationships that are offensive to the social mores of
the community where the parties reside. 9° There are sociological, religious,
and moral grounds for the prevention of such unions. 9' Additionally, there
is a concomitant desire to restrict inter-breeding that is too close.'92 The
concern here is to avoid marriages that are thought to be eugenically harmful,
with the risk of severely handicapped offspring. In essence, it is the public
187. Charles W. Taintor, II, Effect of Extra-State Marriage Ceremonies, 10 Miss. L.J. 105,
105 (1938).
188. See generally Mette v. Mette 1 SW Tr 416 (1859); Sottomayor v. De Barros 3 P.D. 1
(P. 1877); Cheni [1965] P. 85.
189. See generally Maddaugh, supra note 4; Baade, supra note 15; Fine, supra note 15;
Engdahl, supra note 15.
190. See Frederic P. Storke, The Incestuous Marriage-Relic Of the Past, 36 U. COLO. L.
REV. 473 (1964); Henry H. Foster, Jr., Marriage: A Basic Civil Right of Man, 37 FORDHAM
L. REV. 51, 61 (1968); Swan, supra note 6, at 37.
191. See North, supra note 5, at 135-36.
192. See supra note 11.
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interest, rather than the personal interest of the respective parties, that
predominantly lies at the heart of this particular incapacity. 19 3 Unfortunately
the key cases in the United States on this area are bedeviled by
inconsistencies which are illuminated in sharp focus by contrasting decisions
on the validity of marriages between uncle and niece194 and between first
cousins.' 95 They reveal a beguiling Hobson's Choice for the legal adviser, a
potpourri of competing state and party interests that tend to obfuscate rational
policy analysis. 96 In examining these cases it is suggested that an optimal
solution can be extrapolated to govern this specific issue of capacity.
In re May's Estate'97 has proved enduringly controversial.' 98 Two
New York domiciliaries, an uncle and niece by the half blood, went to Rhode
Island to marry and returned immediately (within two weeks of the
ceremony) to live in New York. They made their home there for thirty-two
years until the wife's death. They had six children together. Rhode Island
law permitted such unions between Jews, but according to the law of New
York, a marriage between uncle and niece was declared by statute to be
"incestuous and void."' 99  Subsequently, the "husband" sought to be
appointed as administrator of his wife's estate, but this was contested by one
of their recalcitrant daughters on the ground that the marriage was invalid.
However, the uncle as widower of his deceased niece, was allowed by the
New York Court of Appeals to succeed to her property.2 °0 Although the
court determined that New York was the only state significantly affected by
the question of capacity as it pertained to the litigious issue, nonetheless it
held the relationship "not offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree
regarded generally with abhorrence and thus not within the inhibitions of
natural law."' ' This meant that the case called for the application of the
general rule that a marriage valid where solemnized is valid in every other
193. See Jaffey, supra note 41, at 44-45.
194. See supra note 92.
195. See id.
196. See Maddaugh, supra note 4, at 124.
197. See In the Matter of May, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
198. See generally Reese, supra note 5, at 258; Fine, supra note 15, at 62-63.
199. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law, ch. 19, § 5 (3). "A marriage is incestuous and void whether
the relatives are legitimate or illegitimate between either: ... (3.) An uncle and niece or an
aunt and nephew." Id.
200. See May, 114 N.E.2d at 7.
201. Id.
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state; the consorts' capacity to marry was consequently submitted to Rhode
Island law.2°2
In re May's Estate vividly exemplifies the truism that hard cases
make bad law.203 The merits of equitable property resolution supplanted the
choice of law capacity issue. As Von Mehren and Trautman have stressed,
the Court of Appeals may have been dissatisfied with the domestic outcome.
"On occasion courts dealing with purely domestic problems seize upon
irrelevant or insignificant factual distinctions to take a case out of the rule
that would normally govern ...An aspect of this process of interest to us is the
use of relevant or insignificant multistate elements to provide an escape valve
from harsh or obsolescent domestic law."2 °4 New York Domestic Relations
Law was overridden by the fact that the place of marriage celebration was
outside state borders. Rhode Island, however, lacked any tangible interest in
the resolution of the dispute. The focal point of the matter was New York,
and its system of law ought to have been applicable. The parties resided
therein for thirty-two years, they were immolated there, and the match was
deemed intolerable to the social mores of New York. The marriage would
have been denied validity if performed in that state and was no less abhorrent
to that community because Rhode Island was the transient place of
celebration.2 °5 It represents a dysfunctional abdication of a properly
structured choice of law process.
In marked contrast stands the case of Devine v. Rodgers °6 where the
system of law of the most affected state was given priority. A United States
national, who was domiciled in Pennsylvania, married his niece in Russia,
and then sought to establish her right to enter the United States as his wife.
Under the existing Russian law there was capacity for Jews, such as this
couple, to marry within the relevant degree of consanguinity.0 7 However,
the District Court of Pennsylvania denied entry to the niece on the basis that
202. But see Catalano v. Catalano, 170. A.2d 726 (1961). The primary issue also focused
on the validity of a union between an uncle and niece. Their relationship was held invalid by
applying the law of the state of the husband's domicile where the spouses established their
matrimonial residence. Hence, the wife was prevented from claiming a widow's right of
support from the estate of her husband. See id.
203. See Reese, supra note 5, at 258-61 (justifying the decision).
204. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & DONALD THEODORE TRAUTMAN, The Law of
Multistate.
205. See Maddaugh, supra note 4, at 133
206. See generally Devine v. Rodgers, 109 F. 886 (Pa.D. 1901); In re Takahashi's Estate
129 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1942) (denying inheritance); State v. Bel, 7 Baxt. 9 (Tenn. 1872)
(denying cohabitation).
207. See id. at 887.
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the cohabitation of this couple in Pennsylvania would be offensive to the
inhabitants of that state. The court opined:
Whatever may be the standard of conduct in another
country, the moral sense of this community would
undoubtedly be shocked at the spectacle of an uncle and
niece liking together as husband and wife; and I am, of
course, bound to regard the standard that prevails here, and
to see that such an objectionable example is not presented
to the public." 8
In Devine v. Rodgers, the capacity of an intending perambulatory
immigrant to marry her uncle was submitted to the law of the matrimonial
residence, which was the state identified as most affected by the impact of
the proposed union. This intended matrimonial home test ought similarly to
have been applied in In re May's Estate to invalidate the union under New
York law; it was that system of law most closely associated to the
consanguinous relationship. Public rather than private interest is most at
stake here, and the purpose of the rule is to deny validity to a marriage that
contravenes the social mores of the community where the couple actually
resides, the place where they are inculcated.
The policy of a country will not significantly be impinged upon by
a marriage where the marital home is established abroad, even in a situation
where one of the parties had their pre-nuptial domicile in the forum state.20 9
Consider for instance, a woman domiciled in New York who marries her
uncle in Egypt, the uncle being a domiciliary of this latter state. In a scenario
where the respective parties settle in Egypt after the marriage, no legitimate
policy ground exists to invalidate the union. The system of law with the
greatest interest in governing marital validity is Egyptian; this is the state and
locale most impacted by the relationship. A marriage in such circumstances
ought not to be invalid provided the parties establish a matrimonial home in
208. Devine, 109 F. at 888. See also In the Matter of G, 6 1 & N Dec. 337 (1954). Under
Pennsylvania law, the court refused to allow the Italian niece of a Pennsylvanian domiciliary
to enter the United States for permanent residence. See id. The couple had previously
married in Italy. See id. But see In the Matter of T, 6 I & N. Dec. 529 (1960). A
Czechoslovakian woman married her uncle, a Pennsylvanian domiciliary, in her home state
abroad. See id. Her right to enter was allowed by the tribunal which declared that in 1960,
"the state of the locus of their intended residence" would not view their relationship as a
criminal infraction See id. at 531.
209. See Cheni [1965] P. 85. See Swan, supra note 6, at 35 (discussing Cheni).
2000]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
a country by the law of which the union is valid, and the establishment of this
home is within a reasonable time from the date of marriage celebration.21 °
There are similar vacillations in the United States in its treatment of
marriage relationships between first cousins. In the well-known authority of
Meisenholder v. Chicago 8 N. W. Reg. Co.,21 first cousins domiciled in
Illinois were within the prohibited degree of relationship under Illinois
statutory law. They contracted marriage in Kentucky in conformity with the
requirements of Kentucky law, and then returned to cohabit in Illinois.
Subsequently, the woman claimed compensation as the surviving spouse of
her first cousin under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The putative husband died in Illinois in the course of his employment, but
suit was brought against the employer in Minnesota. The claim failed on the
basis that the original "marriage" was invalid. Illinois law was determinative
on the matter of the consorts' capacity to marry one another.
Similarly in Schutt v. Siems,21 2 a first cousin marriage was also
declared invalid. The couple married in Minnesota and had been denied a
marriage license in Illinois where the woman was domiciled because they
were first cousins. The marriage laws of Minnesota recognized the capacity
of the parties to effect a valid union. The matrimonial residence was also
established in Minnesota. Thereafter, the parties, as a married couple,
petitioned the Illinois court to adopt a child. The court rejected the adoption
and acted in the role ofparens patriae for orphans. It held that the parties'
marriage in Minnesota was "void" and "incestuous" under the governing lex
fori principles. Illinois standards on capacity to marry were applied to a
relationship where one of the parties was a pre-nuptial domiciliary of that
state.
What would be the impact of the application of the proposed intended
matrimonial home test for consanguinity issues on the validity of these two
marriages? In the former case of Meisenhelder, the ratio decidendi would
be unaffected. The parties resided in Illinois, and under that system of law
the relationship was void. Hence, the actual outcome in the case of marital
invalidity would be replicated. A contrary result, however, would apply in
210. See Jaffey, supra note 41, at 44. According to Davie, if no matrimonial home is
established then the court should, in cases of both consanguinity and affinity, refer to the
parties' ante-nuptial domiciliary laws and rely on the presumption of marital validity as
governing cases of conflict between these respective laws. See Davie, supra note 12, at 53.
211. See generally Meisenhelder v. Chicago N.W.R.R. Co., 213 N.W. 32 (Minn. 1927); see
Reese, supra note 5, at 261-62 (discussing Meisenhelder); Fine, supra note 15, at 56-57
(discussing Meisenhelder).
212. See People v. Ludwig, 198 Ill. App. 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1916).
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Schutt v. Siems. The couple established a matrimonial home in Minnesota,
where the marriage was celebrated, and under that system of law the parties
had capacity. It is submitted that it was inappropriate for Illinois law, as the
pre-nuptial domiciliary law of one of the parties, to void a union that did not
offend the community where they actually lived, where they had the focal
epicenter of their existence, and whose public interest was most affected.
The application of an intended matrimonial home test as a policy sensitive
panacea to govern the choice of law issue of capacity would have effected a
more equitable and compelling result.
A markedly different policy base underpins relationships by
marriage: a prohibited degree of relationship on the ground of affinity. Of
primary concern here is maintenance of family stability." 3 Rules on affinity
have developed on moral and social grounds. There is a predilection to
prevent disruption within the family enclave created by marriage between
stepfather and stepdaughter;" 4 these unions are regarded as a blot on the
escutcheon of family life with the likelihood of being highly disruptive of the
former marriage of the stepfather. In similar vein, marriage between
adoptive siblings might impact adversely upon the family unit, and there is
a holistic concern that certain partnerships might constitute abuse of the
relationship and facilitate unwelcome sexual exploitation.2" 5 Outside of the
strictures of the stepparent and stepchild or adoptive siblings' relationships,
the general rules have been tempered to allow marriage with a deceased
spouse's sister or brother216 because these relationships are less likely to
egregiously disrupt the family enclave. Of more recent origin is the
extension of statutory rules promulgating marriage between a divorced
spouse's brother and sister.2" 7
The danger of tensions within the family, such as marriage to one's
former daughter-in-law, is thus the central tenet guiding the affinity
principles. In the light of this implication, and to focus on the personal
interests and welfare of the parties, it is submitted that the pre-nuptial
domiciliary laws of both respective parties have the greatest interest in being
applied. The personal law of the parties ought to be determinative on the
question of the validity of the marriage compact. This contrasts with rule-
213. See North, supra note 5, at 135.
214. See BROMLEY & LOWE, BROMLEY'S FAMILY LAW 37 (8th ed., 1992). See Marriage Act
of 1949 § 1 (5).
215. See CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 16, at 320.
216. See Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage Act, 1907; Deceased Brother's Widow's
Marriage Act, 1921; Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act, 1931.
217. See Marriage (Enabling) Act, 1960.
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selection for consanguinity,218 as previously considered, where public interest
concerns lead to a preferred intended matrimonial test that applies the system
of law of the most affected insulated community. For affinity rules, the
threatened abuse of family enclaves is best left to be determined by each
party's domiciliary law that governs their personal status.
The dual domicile test is well established in English law as the
guiding test for issues of both affinity and consanguinity. In the context of
affinity, it was clearly adopted in Mette v. Mette.219 A domiciled Englishman
married his deceased wife's sister in Germany, contrary to the existing
affinity rules at the time. 22  They came to reside in England. It was
determined that the marriage was invalid because under English law the man
lacked capacity to contract such a marriage. Sir Creswell stated, "There
could be no valid contract unless each was competent to contract with the
other., 221 In effect, an explicit adoption of the dual domicile test for affinity
matters.222
In the United States, no one test has pre-dominated the affinity
impediment. The court in Tyler v. Andrews223 was prepared to apply a place
of celebration test to govern the issue. Two Maryland domiciliaries, a
stepparent and stepchild, sought to circumvent the prohibition on marriage
imposed by their home state by marrying in Ohio and then returning to
Maryland. When the husband died his widow successfully petitioned the
court to acquire a one half interest in the estate left by the deceased in the
District of Columbia. The capacity to marry issue was determined by the
court to be governed by Ohio law,224 the place of marital celebration.
However, in Osoinach v. Watkins, 225 a rule-selection test based on application
of the parties' ante-nuptial domicile led to the invalidation of the marriage
218. See Davie, supra note 12, at 53; supra note 209 (for contradictory views that
matrimonial domicile governs both consanguinity and affinity).
219. See generally Mette, 1 SWTr. 416 (1859); supra note 187.
220. Supra note 215.
22 1. Mette, 1 S.W.Tr. at 423; see generally Fentiman, supra note 14, at 271.
222. See Marriage (Enabling) Act, 1960, § 1 (3) (providing explicit statutory support for a
dual domicile approach). This abolished the prohibition on a woman marrying her former
husband's brother, nephew, or uncle and a man marrying his divorced or deceased's wife's
sister, niece, or aunt. The choice of law provision states that: "this section does not validate
a marriage if either party to it is at the time of the marriage domiciled in a country outside
Great Britain, and under the law of that country there cannot be a valid marriage between the
parties." Id.
223. See Tyler v. Andrews, 40 App. D.C. 100 (D.C. Cir. 1913).
224. See id. at 103-05.
225. See generally Osoinach, 180 So. 577 (1938).
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contract.226 It is submitted that the approach adopted in Osoinach is
preferable because the underlying policy bases for affinity of preventing
family disruption indicates that a dual domicile perspective is optimal. In
contradistinction, for consanguinity the intended matrimonial home test
ought to be paramount as aesthetically it best fits the sociological, religious,
and moral underpinnings of the impediment.
D. Polygamy
The institution of marriage is intimately connected with
religious, moral and social factors. In Western legal
systems the principal influence to shape the accepted
conception of marriage has been Christianity. The result of
this has been that monogamous unions alone are permitted
and polygamous relationships looked upon with disfavour.
In many Eastern countries, however, where different
religions and social conditions prevail, polygamy is
regarded as a perfectly normal and acceptable aspect of the
marriage institution. Each of these views as to the marriage
relationship simply reflects different social concerns.227
Of paramount significance to the Anglo-American tradition of
denying validity to polygamous marriages is the aim universally to prescribe
the institution of monogamy.228 A polygamous marriage where the
matrimonial residence is established in England or any state in the United
States will be primafacie struck down as offensive to the local mores of the
impacted community.2 9 The moral and cultural structure of our societies is
based upon exclusivity of marital partnership.2 3' There is a religious
undercurrent to this state of affairs, which has been called upon as a
justification for the ban on same sex marriages, bigamy, and polygamous
unions.' In Eastern countries, as the above quotation indicates, different
226. A marriage took place in Georgia between two Alabama domiciliaries. See id. They
sought to evade the extant prohibition under Alabama law of a marriage of a man to his
uncle's widow. See id.
227. See Davie, supra note 12, at 50.
228. See Jaffey, supra note 41, at 39.
229. See id.
230. See MCCLEAN, supra note 16, at 172-78, NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 16,at 617-
626.
231. See North, supra note 5, at 136.
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religions and social conditions are prevalent which makes polygamous
marriage a perfectly acceptable form of institution.23 2 It seems to be self-
evident that the state with the most important interest in whether
monogamous or polygamous relationships are permissible is the very state
where the matrimonial residence is established.233 This is the community
which is most affected by the union, which has to deal with the incidents of
the parties' status, and which has to cope with a marriage beyond the
confines of prevailing social mores.
The English and United States prohibitions against polygamy are
designed to safeguard the traditional marriage family structure. It is
overwhelmingly a rule molded to protect the public interests of the state as
set against the personal interest of the parties. 234 The intended matrimonial
home is the community that avowedly has the greatest concern in the status
and validity of the marriage. In this context it is important to further assess
the extent of the orthodox Anglo-American choice of law principle. Is it the
purpose of the rule to deny validity to a polygamous union where a
domiciliary never establishes a matrimonial home within state borders? One
suggests that it be outside the ambit of legitimate interest to impose
monogamy on foreign communities, even where one of the parties is a
domiciliary of the forum state. To impose such a restrictive encumbrance
demonstrates a palpable breach of international comity and a lack of respect
for prevalent local culture. Such a restriction is unmeritorious to an
unacceptable degree. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical situation where
a New York woman wishes to contract a polygamous marriage with an
Egyptian man, the matrimonial residence to be set up in Cairo. It would
show a contumelious disregard of Eastern values, their religions, social, and
moral infrastructure, to declare such a union invalid. In any event, the New
York domicile will be lost soon after the marriage with the acquisition of an
Egyptian domicile of choice. What purpose is served in applying a rigid
invalidating dual domicile rule, dependent upon the factually irrelevant
acquisition of a new governing domicile either immediately before or after
the marriage celebration?
235
232. See id., see also CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 16, at 235-37.
233. See Jaffey, supra note 41, at 39-41.
234. See id. at 42.
235. See generally Sebastian Poulter, Hyde v. Hyde: A Reappraisal, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
475 (1976). The radical suggestion is that the polygamous nature of any marriage contracted
in a foreign country by an English domiciliary should be disregarded in the determination of
its validity for the purposes of English law. See id.
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The intended matrimonial home test is the optimal solution for this
issue of capacity. 236 The crucial focus should be on the country where the
married couple intend to live.2 37 A choice of law will consequentially be
applied which has the greatest interest to the incumbent character of the
marriage contract, which shows primary concern with the physical and legal
attributes of the individuals, not the historical system that adhered to them in
advance of the ceremony. The meritorious touchstone of an intended
matrimonial home test was clearly expounded by the English Royal
Commission on Marriage and Divorce back in 1956 in the following terms:
The status of marriage pre-eminently affects society in the
country where the parties live together as husband and wife.
That country represents what has been called the "true seat
of the marriage relation", and it seems socially undesirable
that a union which is regarded there as not detrimental to the
community should be pronounced void, simply because one
or other or both of the parties were formerly connected with
a country in which a different view prevails.238
Although there is broad English support for a dual domicile test to be
applied to all aspects of capacity, nonetheless there is some recognition,
albeit only at first instance, for applying the intended matrimonial home test
to determine capacity to enter a polygamous marriage. Radwan v. Radwan
(No. 2)239 provides an explicit template, on a social justice basis, for
recategorization of the issue of polygamy.20  In Radwan, a domiciled
Englishwoman married a domiciled Egyptian in polygamous form at the
Egyptian Consulate General in Paris. This marriage was not only potentially
but also actually polygamous, for in the previous year the husband had
236. Jaffey has propounded the following rule selection test: "a polygamous marriage is
invalid if, and only if, it is invalid by the law of either party's domicile at the time of the
marriage, provided that it is not invalid if, within a reasonable time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties establish a matrimonial home in a country by the law of which the
marriage is valid." Jaffey, supra note 41, at 42. A dual domicile test prevails where no
matrimonial home is established within a reasonable time frame. See id.
237. See generally Fentiman, supra note 14, at 256; Smart, supra note 14, at 225.
238. Cmd. 9678, para 889.
239. See generally Radwan, [1973] Fam. 35; supra note 44.
240. Many academics criticize the decision. See generally J.A. Wade, Capacity to Marry:
Choice of Law Rules and Polygamous Marriages, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 571 (1973);
Karsten, supra note 53; David Pearl, Capacityfor Polygamy, CAMBRIDGEL.J. 43 (1973). But
see Jaffey, supra note 41; Stone, supra note 43 (providing support for the decision.)
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married his first wife in Egypt by Islamic rites. The couple established their
matrimonial home in Egypt, as they had intended at the time of marriage, but
five years later they moved to live in England. 241 The union was fruitful in
the sense that eight children were born to the couple. Thereafter, the husband
purported to divorce his second wife by means of a Jewish religious divorce
process by serving the ghet at the Egyptian Consulate General in London. In
turn the wife petitioned the English court for a divorce. Directly raised,
therefore, was the question of the capacity of an English domiciliary to enter
into an actually polygamous marriage. It was determined by the court that
the intended matrimonial home theory governed the issue, rejecting
authorities that asserted that capacity was governed by the law of each party's
ante-nuptial domicile, and asserting instead that the propositus "had capacity
to enter into a polygamous union by virtue of her pre-nuptial decision to
separate herself from the law of her domicile and make her life with her
husband in his country, where the Mohammedan law of polygamous
marriage was the normal institution of marriage.' 242
The outcome in Radwan was socially just because Egyptian law was
the system of law that was determinative, the parties had lived together for
a significant number of years in that country, and both believed for over 19
years that their union was valid evidenced by the birth of eight children under
that prevailing assumption. English susceptibilities were not affected as they
only lived together in the community after the husband's divorce from his
first wife.243 In rejecting the traditional dual domicile approach,24 the
judgement of the court was subjected to hostile academic comment,245 a
response evidently anticipated.246
As an example of functional recategorization to achieve a preferred
outcome, Radwan is to be applauded. The policy sensitive application of an
intended matrimonial home test, obviating rigid jurisdiction-selection, and
applying depecage principles to a specific compartmentalized capacity issue,
represents a Utopian settlement on public interest grounds. It raises a
vignette for future development, a standard bearer for the facilitation of
241. Prior to the move to England, the husband had divorced his first wife. See Radwan,
[1973] Fam.
242. Id. "Nothing in this judgment bears upon the capacity of minors, the law of affinity,
or the effect of bigamy upon capacity to enter a monogamous union." Id.
243. See North, supra note 70, at 29.
244. See generally Glenn supra note 46 (applying a via media).
245. See supra note 239.
246. See Radwan, [1973] Fain. at 54.
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greater flexibility producing higher levels of social justice, but without
departing in too great an extent from the necessary certainty in rule
formulation required by all interested parties in the capacity equation.
Shortly after the decision in Radwan, section 1 1(d) of the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 came into force. It states: "A marriage
celebrated after the 31 st July 1971 shall be void on the following grounds: (d)
in the case of a polygamous marriage entered into outside England and
Wales, that either party was at the time of the marriage domiciled in England
and Wales." This provision, read by itself, seems to exclude the possibility
of an English domiciliary entering into a valid polygamous marriage, even
in a scenario where the matrimonial home is a country permitting
polygamy.247 However, the antidote of section 14 (1) of the same Act may
temper the intransigence that is implicated by the section.248 In effect, the
terms of section 14 (1) provide that section 11 will only be applicable to
invalidate a marriage where, according to the rule of private international
law, the validity of the union falls to be tested by English law. The
consequence is that section 11 does not apply if the marital validity is
determinable by a foreign law. This interpretation means that section 11 (d)
is not a conflicts rule. Instead, it is constrained to simply being a purely
English domestic rule that is only applicable under common law where
English law is the governing law. Read in conjunction with section 14 the
efficacy of section 11 (d) is limited and will not preclude the validity of a
polygamous marriage where one of the parties is domiciled in England. This
will apply provided that the matrimonial home is other than England. If
England is the intended matrimonial home, then a polygamous marriage will
be invalid even in a situation where both parties were domiciled in an Eastern
country when they celebrated the new marriage.249
The United States choice of law rules have demonstrated an
impregnable denial of polygamous marriages contracted within the forum.25°
247. § 11 (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 was not applicable to the marriage in
Radwan which occurred in 1951. This Act is only relevant to a marriage celebrated after July
31, 1971.
248. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 619
249. See generally Hussain v. Hussain [1983] Fam. 26. Academics have criticized the
decision. See P.B. CARTER, THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1982, 298
(1983); see generally Adrian Briggs, Polygamous Marriages and English Domiciliaries, 32
INT'L COMp. L.Q. 737 (1983); David Pearl, Polygamy for English Domiciliaries?, 42
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 26 (1983); Rhona Schuz, When is a Polygamous Marriage Not a
Polygamous Marriage?, 46 MOD. L. REV. 653 (1983); Sebastian Poulter, Polygamy-New
Law Commission Proposals, 13 FAM. L. Q. 72 (1983).
250. See supra note 89; Earle, 126 N.Y.S. 317 (1910).
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The propagation of monogamous relationships has generally reigned
supreme.2 1' This denial of subsidiarity has also infected the treatment of the
incidents of polygamous marriages where the matrimonial residence is
established outside state territorial borders.252 An unwelcome manifestation
of this unenlightened orthodoxy is represented by the unfortunate treatment
prescribed to children of polygamous marriages of United States residents
contracted in China. In two federal cases, De Sylva v. Ballentine253 and In re
Look Wong,254 the courts refused to recognize the effectuality of such
relationships for immigration purposes.
In re Look Wong was the earlier of the two authorities. The husband,
an American resident, returned to China and married a second wife, a
Chinese domiciliary, during the subsistence of his first marriage. Thereafter,
a son of this second marriage sought to enter the United States as a "child"
of the United States-resident father, under the extant provisions of the
applicable immigration statute. This application was contumeliously rejected
by the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 5 5 In the
leadingjudgement, Judge Clemons asserted that the polygamous relationship
that effected the immigrant's claimed status, "contravenes the spirit and
policy of our laws and institutions., 256 By ingenuous sleight of hand, the
"laws and institutions" of the interested state were equated to the amorphous
concept of the principles underlying the systems of family law of all of the
states of the union. In essence, federal law was superimposed as a conduit
for the universal imposition of recognition being accorded to purely
monogamous relationships.
With respect, the decision of the District Court in In re Look Wong
reveals an appallingly insensitive breach of international comity, and a lack
of recognition for the disparate social and religious mores prevailing in a
foreign legal system. The decision, which effectively denied any recognition
to the incidents of a polygamous marriage relationship, was predicated upon
the touchstone of the pre-nuptial domiciliary law of the United States
resident abrogating any validity to the marriage contract. On subsidiarity
grounds, a more compelling rule-selection would have been the preferred
251. See Maddaugh, supra note 4, at 124.
252. See Fine, supra note 15, at 49-50.
253. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
254. See In re Look Wong, 4 U.S. Dist. Ct. Hawaii 568 (1915); see also Ng Suey Hi v.
Weedin, 21 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1927).
255. See Fine, supra note 15, at 49.
256. See id.
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intended matrimonial home test, leading to application of the Chinese system
of law by whose terms the second marriage was perfectly valid with
legitimate offspring. In a similar factual matrix in Radwan, involving a pre-
nuptial domiciliary of the forum contracting a polygamous marriage valid by
their intended matrimonial residence, the efficacious outcome was to uphold
the validity of the relationship. Social justice requirements in In re Look
Wong indicated that the immigration provisions ought to have been satisfied.
The preferred solution for this capacity issue is to adopt an intended
matrimonial home test as the community most publicly affected by the
establishment of the polygamous relationship. Two further questions,
however, need to be addressed in this context. First, consider the case where
the parties to a polygamous marriage celebrated in an Eastern country are
domiciled there at the time of marriage celebration, but settle in the United
States (or England) soon after the marriage. By application of dual domicile
theory, the marriage is valid, but should it be invalid on the basis that it
infringes the public policy of the forum? It is submitted that despite an
underlying policy concern of promoting marital validity where possible, in
such factual circumstances the intended matrimonial home test should
nonetheless still be determinative. Polygamy is contrary to the religious
beliefs and customs of the community that they have voluntarily infiltrated;
no injustice is done to the respective parties in applying that system of law
to determine their status." 7 Of course, it will be otherwise if the parties
reside for a reasonable period of time in the former Eastern country by whose
laws they have contracted a valid polygamous marriage.
This leads to the second related question of what constitutes a
"reasonable time" in this context; the connotation itself is undoubtedly
vague. There is little difficulty in delineating between periods of ten years
as opposed to ten days of habitation, but other time frames may be more
problematic. It is submitted, however, that this difficulty is not
insurmountable. In practice it will be a rare case where there is a long
delayed establishment of a matrimonial home. By adopting a common sense
perspective a court will lean in favor of holding a time period as reasonable
if the consequence of that decision will not precipitate undue complications
or problems as to the status of the relevant individuals or affect rights of
257. But see Jaffey, supra note 41, at 40 (suggesting that public policy in England and the
United States should tolerate a polygamous marriage even where the parties come to live in
England. This is on the premise that the marriage is in accordance with the mores of the
parties community when they married).
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succession. 8 Overall the intended matrimonial home test for polygamous
relationships, despite some attendant difficulties in very limited cases, is to
be commended as the functional rule-selection approach for this
compartmentalized area.
E. Consent
A marriage will be invalid for lack of consent in circumstances where
the apparent consent was vitiated by some defect such as duress, fraud,
mistake, or unsoundness of mind.25 9 There is a lack of intention to effectuate
a valid marriage contract.26 ° Outside of these traditional grounds of consent,
there co-exists an agglomeration of disparate physical impediments; 261 a
marriage may be voidable on account of impotence,262 wilful refusal to
263consummate, pregnancyper alium, venereal disease unknown to the other
party, sterility, and mistake as to attributes. 26  In such a scenario, an
individual is thrust into an imperfect marriage that they have not bargained
for, and cavills against this unwelcome state of affairs.
The underlying premise for the impediment of lack of true consent,
in both types of situations, is to safeguard the aggrieved party from the
consequences of their misapprehension and confusion.265 There is a subtle
nuance in the underlying policy bases for these rules, which embodies a
fudged compromise between conflicting domestic policies. On one side of
the coin it is implicit that it is morally indefensible and socially ineffectual
that a true and valid consent to marriage has been precluded. On the other
end of the spectrum, it is important to uphold the reasonable expectations of
the other marital partner and the sanctity of the marriage contract.266 The
258. See generally Stone, supra note 43.
259. See generally NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 2, at 646-47; McCLEAN, supra note 16,
at 166-67; CLARKSON &HILL, supra note 16, at 333-35.
260. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 579.
261. See Davie, supra note 12, at 54.
262. In the United States, if the petitioner knew or ought to have known of the impotence
then annulment will be refused. See CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 10 (1968).
263. See generally W.D. Bishop, Choice ofLawfor Impotence and WilfulRefusal, 41 MOD.
L. REV. 512 (1978), LENNART PALSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS
312-13 (1981); NORTH, THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MATRIMONIAL CAUSES IN THE
BRITISH ISLES AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 126 (1977).
264. See Palsson, supra note 262, at 305.
265. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 579.
266. See id.
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tensions between these competing policies have determined that the
boundaries on the constituents of lack of consent in Anglo-American law are
strictly construed. This means, for instance, that a simple mistake as to the
financial standing and social pre-eminence of the other spouse does not
constitute a binding ground for acquisition of a nullity decree, nor does
threatened social or penury bankruptcy.
The most affected state in the consent equation, which has the
greatest concern in protecting the denuded party from the effects of defective
consent, will be the pre-nuptial domiciliary law of that individual
immediately prior to the marriage celebration. In essence, it would be futile
to unwillingly hold such an individual embedded to a marriage, which
according to the tenets of his own community is defective.2 67  That
community, which governs his personal status, is most implicated in
effecting the well-being of their own domiciles, and the aggrieved party
should have the degree of protection accordingly laid down by their own
personal law. This meets with the reasonable expectations standard in that
whether a marriage is defective or not can legitimately be tested by the
party's community to which he belongs at the time of the marriage
ceremony.2 68 The focus of the policy sensitive analysis herein is to suitably
protect an aggrieved party, and unlike the impediments of consanguinity and
polygamy, is not to propagate the public interest requirements of the
established matrimonial residence.
For this category in the pantheon of essential validity, the intended
matrimonial home test seems wholly devoid of merit. The preferred option
of pre-nuptial domiciliary law needs to be adopted in a salutary fashion. In
circumstances where the marriage relationship is not defective by the
petitioner's own personal law, it would be fallacious for him to superimpose
attenuated protection through reliance on principles conferred by the law of
the other party's domicile, at some third state law. Governance of these
issues ought to be in accordance with the extant personal law of the allegedly
non-consenting party, with the stipulated grounds only subsisting in favor of
that particular individual.2 69 The extent to which such a rule-selection test is
apposite is thrown into even sharper relief by considering the two leading
267. See Jaffey, supra note 41, at 48; Davie, supra note 12, at 60-61.
268. But see Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 34 (1977); P.R.H. Webb, Shot-Gun Marriages and the Conflict of
Laws, 22 MOD. L. REV. 198, 203 (1959).
269. See Horowitz, supra note 104, at 755. In true conflicts cases, the determinative choice
of law ought to be that which has the most intense interest vis h vis the disputed issue. See
Davie, supra note 12, at 61.
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Anglo-American authorities on consent, those of Fusco v. Fusco27 ° and
Szechter v. Szechter.f 1
In Fusco, the petitioner, a native of Syracuse, New York, went to
Italy in 1937 to study medicine, and in 1942 he married an Italian
domiciliary. He was immediately called up for service in an Italian military
hospital, after the conclusion of his wedding and remained in Italy after the
war until August 1946. On his return to Syracuse, he filed for an annulment
of the marriage on the basis that he had entered it under duress. His evidence
was that he had gone to Italy only to study medicine, intending at all times
to return to Syracuse, but he had married an Italian domiciliary under
coercion. He claimed that she and members of her family threatened that if
he did not marry her they would send him to a concentration camp as an
enemy alien. He also contended that the couple had never voluntarily
cohabited. In reply, the respondent appeared by counsel, confirming the
residence of the defendant and the existence of the marriage, but otherwise
entering a general rebuttal to the duress claim.
The Supreme Court of New York found in favor of the petitioner.
The court congratulated him for demonstrating sufficient foresight to avoid,
"such a demoniac place of torture" as an Italian concentration camp."' In
applying the extant personal law of the non-consenting party, the law of the
New York domiciliary, the outcome accords with the preferred solution
propounded for this capacity issue. This was the system of law which had
the primary interest in its rule being applied, a rule designed to prevent
unwilling individuals from being coerced into the bonds of matrimony.
Further examination of the case, however, reveals a totally
convoluted and opaque reasoning being applied by the court.273 Two
additional grounds were posited for nullity. First, is a principle applicable to
marriage contracts in the same vein as general commercial contracts.
"[D]uring the tendency of a state of war valid contracts cannot be made
between citizens of the respective nations." '274 The second ground was the
failure of the petitioner to produce a "certificate of no impediment" from his
national authority at the time of the ceremony. This was asserted to be a
270. See Fusco v. Fusco, 107 N.Y.S.2d 286; 288 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Baade, supra note 15, at
373-77.
271. See Szechter v. Szechter, 2 W.L.R. 170 (Eng. 1971).
272. See Fusco, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
273. See Baade, supra note 15, at 374-76.
274. See Fusco, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 288-89.
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prerequisite in accordance with article 116 of the Italian Civil Code. 275 As
Baade, has previously stated, 76 neither of these grounds can withstand
judicial scrutiny. To the extent that they are extraneous to the legitimate
result in the case they should be disregarded.277
Of similar doubtful merit is the application of the Second
Restatement formula to this case. The validating lex loci formula of section
283 (2) would point to the adoption of Italian law being applied, unless it is
excluded by the exception as violating the "strong public policy" of New
York under the most significant relationship test. A classic conflicts
dilemma exists with Italian law interested in extending to the respondent the
benefits of their strict rule preserving matrimonial ties. New York law points
in the opposite direction by allowing the aggrieved petitioner its protection
against coercion and duress.278 To refer to "most significant relationship" in
such a true-conflict seems meaningless. This can be avoided through the
optimal rule-selection technique of applying the pre-nuptial domiciliary law
of the allegedly non-consenting petitioner; an aroma of inclusively for this
principle needs to be disseminated.
In English law, the rigid dual domicile test holds sway over the issue
of the consent of the parties.2 9 This is evident in the leading case of Szechter
v. Szechter, S° in which the parties had to endure political persecution and
anti-Semitism in Poland. A couple had married in Poland, the country of
their common domicile. This marriage had been entered into to secure the
women's release from political detention; she had been sentenced to three
275. See id. at 288.
276. See Baade, supra note 15, at 374-76. The first ground is refused on the basis that it is
of marginal consequence-authority existed to the effect that a marital contract was outside
the ambit of the rule. See Fasbender v. Attorney-General 2 Ch. 850, 858 (1922), SIR ARNOLD
DUNCAN MCNAIR, LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 131 (3rd ed., 1948).
277. The second ground was a brutum fulmen in that the production of a legally
unobtainable New York document would have added nothing if available. See Baade, supra
note 15, at 374-77.
278. See Baade, supra note 15, at 376-77.
279. This is certainly the case for the traditional consent grounds of duress, fraud, and
mistake. See Way [ 1950] P. 71, at 78-79; see generally Kenward [ 1950] All E.R. 297. More
opaque is the opposite test for the other disparate physical impediment grounds such as
impotence and wilful refusal. See generally Easterbrook v. Easterbrook [ 1944] P. 10; Hutter
v. Hutter [1974] P. 95 (adopting the lex fori); see Robert v. Robert [1947] P. 1643; Addison
v. Addison [1955] N. Ir. 1, 30 (for the lex loci calebrationis); see Ponticelli v. Ponticelli
[1958] P. 204 (applying the law of the husband's domicile); see De Reneville v. De Reneville
[1948] P. 100 (applying a governing intended matrimonial home test).
280. See 2 W.L.R. 170 (1971); see generally Hartley, supra note 5.
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years imprisonment for anti-state activities. Because of her failing health and
the ill-treatment received in prison, she was frightened that she would not
survive the term. Dr Szechter, a well-known Polish historian who was also
a Jew, had, together with his wife, treated the girl almost as a child of the
family. She had been persecuted at the hands of the Nazis. He divorced his
first wife to marry her so that she could accompany him out of the country.
Subsequently, the parties came to England and petitioned the court for a
decree of nullity on the basis of duress. Sir Jocelyn Simon held that she had
not consented."' 1 The justice of the case undoubtedly demanded that this
result be achieved. Hence, the husband could remarry his first wife as
intended. However, less praiseworthy was Sir Jocelyn's apparent
endorsement of the dual domicile theory to matters of consent, adopting
Dicey's rule that the essential validity of a marriage was referable to the law
of both parties' pre-nuptial domicile. In effect, this means that one party can
rely on lack of consent under the existing provisions of the other party's
domiciliary law.
It is submitted that the position adopted in Szechter, which has not
been resiled from, is over-broad and countermines the underlying policy
basis of consent to give paramountcy to protection of the aggrieved party by
applying their extant personal law. It is they and they alone in whose favor
the stipulated grounds ought to exist. 28 2 If an individual is not entitled to the
protection accorded by the law of his own country, then policy concerns do
not extend to protection conferred by another system of law. This represents
an implicit rule-selection value judgement that it is more egregious to hold
a person to a marriage relationship that is defective by their personal law,
than to remove marital status from the other party under whose laws no
impediment exists. 283 It is submitted that for consent, of either the traditional
or disparate physical impediment kind, the preferred determinative law is that
of the petitioner's domicile at the very time of the marriage. Here again
depecage principles should be operative in Anglo-American law to
compartmentalize a specific category of invalidity.
281. See id. at 177; see generally H v. H [19541 P. 258, Parojcic v. Parojcic I W.L.R. 1280
(P. 1958); Buckland v. Buckland [1968] P. 296.
282. But see Hartley, 35 MOD. L. REV. 571, 581 (1972) (asserting that provided the parties
consent by English law, the marriage should be valid unless no consent exists by the law of
both parties' domiciles; an alternative reference test explicitly promulgating marital validity).
283. See Jaffey, supra note 41, at 48.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article has been dedicated to the theme that choice of law rules
for essential validity can best be appreciated in the light of their underlying
policy-sensitive values. The rigid jurisdiction-selection approaches of dual
domicile under English law and place of celebration in the United States
need to be overridden by reformation of certain and predictable choice of law
rules which are crafted to mold into the specific needs of each issue. The
five main impediment grounds have been considered sequentially by
adopting a comparative analysis of leading Anglo-American jurisprudence
in order to develop narrow optimal rules, each tailored to fit the
compartmentalized issue. Interest analysis is propounded, not on an ad hoc
case by case basis that has infected the American choice of law principles for
tort and contract, 284 but within a structured confined framework to itemized
topics. Rules need to be certain and precise in this area to enable the parties
to prophylactically determine the outcome of state validating or invalidating
rules to particular incapacity grounds; dated rule-skepticism is
consequentially obviated. Marriage validity is an eminently apposite subject
for the application of a modified interest analysis theory, on depecage
principles, to delineate between identifiable community interest in regulating
parties who establish a matrimonial residence within their state borders, as
opposed to the countervailing personal interests of the respective parties.
The policy-sensitive values of the former impinge to a greater degree on
impediments of polygamy, consanguinity, and divorce recognition; the latter
has paramountcy for affinity, non-age, and consent.
In this recategorization of rule formulation there is arguably a
douceur de vivre, an element of greater flexibility that promotes greater
justice, but does not sacrifice the required element of predictability essential
to matters of personal status. This perspective has, it must be duly admitted,
provoked a number of dissenting voices throughout the Commonwealth.
Sykes and Pryles, leading Australian commentators, have strongly intimated
that the idea that, "different aspects of capacity may be governed by different
choice of law rules is hardly to be welcomed. 285  In England, the
recategorization of divorce primacy over capacity provoked the following
caustic response by Carter: "a position devoid of policy justification and one
which could permit unwarranted (and often absurdly pretentious) assertions
284. See supra note 13.
285. See EDWARD I. SYKES & MICHAEL C. PRYLES, AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 428 (3rd ed., 1991).
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of extra-territoriality abhorrent to international comity. ' 286 This view has
been replicated by the English Law Commission in a hypersensitive reaction
to the proposed creation of a separate intended matrimonial home test for
capacity to effect a polygamous marriage, rather than orthodox dual domicile
theory:
On the assumption that Radwan v Radwan (No. 2) was
correctly decided, the question of capacity to enter into a
polygamous marriage is governed by the law of the
parties' intended matrimonial home. However, other
issues of capacity, such as consanguinity, affinity and
bigamy, are, on the basis of the existing authorities,
governed by the dual domicile test. Thus, if Mrs Radwan
had been the niece of Mr Radwan the marriage would
have been held to be void. A woman's capacity to marry
her uncle raises the same sort of issues as her capacity to
marry a man who is already married, and it is difficult to
see what social or policy factors there are for applying
different choice of law rules in these two situations.287
Ultimately, it is submitted that the above criticisms are over-cautious
and over-dramatic in their knee-jerk reaction against functional re-
categorization. The current parlous state of our law, confused and obscure
in its treatment of essential validity, needs to be reformulated for the next
millennium. A new momentum is required to re-examine a subject that has
been, in the main, scandalously neglected on both sides of the Atlantic.
286. See CARTER, supra note 164, at 444.
287. LCWP No. 89 (1985), at para 3-26.
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